أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٦] (١٧٦/١١)

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“ Aliter, as regards the pilots necessary to take the ships through the
“ Canal. That is a consequence of the provision declaring the Canal free at
“all times for navigation Indeed, it is necessary in order to ensure the
“neutrality of the Canal, for the wrecking of a ship in the Canal might by
“obstructing navigation, assist the strategy of one of the belligerents. The
“employment of official pilots (belonging to the Government or the Company)
“ ought therefore to be imposed, especially on ships of war.”
20. Should the suspicions of the pilot be aroused, there are a variety of ways
in which he could delay the ship, or communicate his suspicions to the Canal
authorities through an official at one of the sidings.
It is by no means certain, however, that his suspicions would be aroused,
although, if they were, it is felt that the majority of pilots would do all in their
power to prevent the ships of which they were in charge being wrecked or run ashore.
21. Bribery of pilots might be resorted to, but it is doubtful whether it vrould
be worth while, bearing in view the suspicions which might be aroused if attempts
at bribery proved abortive and became known
Moreover, there can be no assurance that the particular pilots who had been
approached and bribed would be in charge of the particular ship or ships detailed
to carry out the act of sabotage.
Conclusion.
22. The conclusion is reached that the honesty and conscientiousness of the
Canal pilots on the whole is of a high standard, and that their presence would
exercise a deterrent effect in certain cases. If the ship were, however, once
committed to the passage of the Canal, nothing could be done to prevent the pilot
being overpowered as an immediate preliminary to the scuttling of the ship, and
it is quite conceivable that nothing need necessarily happen to arouse his suspicions
prior to his removal from charge.
The possibility of pilots being bribed is by no means remote, and should not
be lost sight of. It would, however, appear that the desired end could be reached
without resort to bribery.
(d.) The ship should he manoeuvred correctly at the last moment, otherwise the block
may he only partial.
23. The dimensions of a typical merchant ship of the kind that might be
employed for this operation may be taken to be 450 feet by 58 feet by 27 feet.
It will be seen by reference to secret chart F 054* that, in order to block
the Canal to anything but the smallest craft, a ship of the above dimensions
would have to be placed at an angle athwart the Canal with her bows resting on
the gradient of one bank and her stern on the gradient of the other. It would not
necessarily be sufficient if she remained in a fore and aft position in relation to
the channel
Correct manipulation of the helm and engines would, immediately prior to the
ship being blown up, place her in the required position, due allowance being made
for the prevailing wind and current.
(e.) The hlockship should he fitted with some means by which she can he rapidly
scuttled.
(f.) The scuttling of the ship should he controlled hy the Captain from the Bridge.
(g.) The hlockship should he loaded with some heavy cargo, such as stone, cement,
ore, railway iron, &c.
24. These desiderata could be achieved in a variety of ways.
The following is a brief outline of the sort of thing that might conceivably
happen:—
There are no material difficulties, and the secret purpose of the preparations
need only be known to a very few people, who could be relied upon implicitly.
25. Several years before Japan anticipates being in a position to commence
hostilities, the Head of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha is approached quietly by the
Government and a plan is proposed by which one or two vessels of the N.Y.K. Fleet
are to be fitted out as blockships in the most secret manner possible.
*Not printed.
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