"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٤٣. الجزء I‏. (من ١ إلى ١٤ نوفمبر ١٩١٧.)" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٢] (٥٠٠/٤٨٨)

Mesopotamia? Please cable reply early and thereafter monthly showing fit
and unfit separately :—
A.—Number of horses and mules in remount depots, by classes.
]3.—Number by classes available and under training with units.
Por classes code letters can be used as in 3rd Echelon, Basrah, B.-776,
Pebruary 11th {By. No. 11685).
Working copy to Q. M. G. \
Copy to M. S. 0.
Telegram P., No. 12161, dated 14th February 1918. APPENDIX 2-79
(Despatched 1-15 p,m.) > (-^y*
From—-The Chief of the General Staff, Delbi w
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Baghdad,
Your X.-64S1 of 11th {By. No. 11583).
Your request for 3 additional Ford Van companies has been strongly
supported by Chief in a wire to C. I. G. S. {By. No. 12009).
Record copy to G. S. (S. D. 1).
Copy to M. S. G., Q. M. G, G. S. (M. O. 1).
'dm--
Telegram P,, No. 99-F., dated 12th February 1918. APPENDIX 280
(Despatched 11-30 p.m., 12th February 1918 j received 8-40 a.m., 13th (%. No. 12196)
Pebruary 1918.)
(Received in Wat Section, 14th February 1918.)
From—His Britannic Majesty^s Minister, Tehran,
To—Foreign Office, 99.
(Repeated Baghdad, and the Secretary to the Government of India Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.)
Cabinet while professing itself desirous of coming to an understanding
with us is showing no inclination to expedite our conversations to conclusion,
&nd, before we reach any real result, (Russian troops v ib c (ai y a\e wi
drawn. Persian Government will do nothing to secure road to Enzeli, with
negotiations still proceeding. Even supposing that our conversations end in a
satisfactory conclusion I do not believe they could do anything really effective
still less that they would ever venture to bar passage of German emissaries
into and through Persia.
I venture to urge therefore that we must seriously consider undertaking
these two tasks ourselves. I am disposed to believe that it will suffice to hold
road as far as Kasvin, but it must be in strength considerably greater than is
necessary merely to police the road, and there must be sufficient force at
Kasvin to impress both on Tehran and Jangalis in Gilin that we cannot be
trifled with. Of Jangali movement which has attained present proportions
chiefly from lack of opposition, I have no great opinion ; indeed I am con
vinced that with our own troops in Persia it would be easy to destroy their
power by stirring np Chief surrounding tribes against them.
If His Majesty’s Government decide to take this step it should be accom
panied at the same time by a declaration of the points on which we are prepared
to meet Persian wishes and an explanation that necessity for defending our own
interests against enemy machinations has forced our action on us. There will
be a certain amount of protest no doubt, but provided we do not stop at half
measures there will he nothing worse ; indeed I anticipate a degree of relief
at seeing that we are forcing Persia out of the vacillation which intelligent
class recognise as fatal to her. Ys matters now stand we appear in a very
ambiguous light. On the one hand we are professing our desire to respect
Persia’s integrity and independence, on the other by such actions as the
extension of our Cordon along the Eastern Frontier, sending armoured cars
in conjunction with General Dunsterville, arrival of military (establishment ?)
with Stokes and financing Russian troops so as to keep them in Persia we
are showing a complete disregard for Persian neutrality. As circumstances
are likely to compel us to use force sooner or later it would seem better to
act at once rather than drag on negotiations entailing ever-increasing con
cessions.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., A. G., Q. M. G., G, S. (M. O 1).