"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٤٣. الجزء I‏. (من ١ إلى ١٤ نوفمبر ١٩١٧.)" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٠] (٥٠٠/٣٤٤)

The above proposal is fully concurred in by the Commission.
Working copy to Q. M. G.
Copy to M. S. C., M. B., G. S. (S. D. 1)
Letter No. 0.-1285-26-680, dated 28th December 1917. APPENDIX 207
(Received in War Section, 5th Eebruary 1918.) No 1]358^
From—The General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force l< D *’
Baghdad, *
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, De 7 hi.
With reference to your No. 18682, dated 80th August 1917 (By. No.
50525), I have the honour to submit the following remarks and suggestions
on the proposed War Establishment of an Indian infantary battalion.
2. With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, I consider that the
platoon should be taken as the basis and not the section. The platoon is now
recognised, as the fighting unit and should be self-contained as far as possible.
It should include only such men as will fight in it in the ranks, and it should
include a Lewis gun and Lewis gun team as one of its four sections. All
others, ie., specially trained men (except bombers and company scouts) and
employed men, should be taken out of the platoon and put into battalion or
company Headquarter. With the battalion strength approximately the same
ss that proposed by you, this gives a platoon of 1 Indian officer and 48 Non
commissioned officers and men, inclusive of Lewis gunners. This is not so
large a number as that aimed at by you but it is a number that a platoon com
mander can normally expect to command until casualties have been incurred.
3, (a)'With reference to paragraph 4 {a) of your letter, every corps and
divisional commander in this force is in agreement with me that a 2nd-in-
bommand is essential. It is realised that it is impossible at the present time
to provide an additional British officer, but it is hoped that this disability is
0nl y a temporary one.
{ft) The inclusion of a signalling officer in battalion headquarter is consi
dered most desirable. In action it is necessary to have an officer to supervise
the signalling communications, and the adjutant has too many other duties
to perform to allow of his doing this. In peace, as well as war, the training
of the signallers keeps an officer fully employed. Thus he will seldom, if
ever, be able to train or fight with his company.
(c) A British officer as transport officer is not considered essential. This
duty could very well be performed by an Indian officer (Jemadar).
{d) Since my last letter on the subject, knowledge of Lewis guns has
been widely spread, and it is considered that company officers should be capa
ble of training their Lewis gun teams, technically as well as tactically, without
the assistance of a battalion expert. I do not, therefore,, consider a Lewis
gun officer necessary,
{e) The proposal to include the Subedar Major, Jemadar Adjutant and
Jemadar Quartermaster in Battalion Headquarters is concurred in. It is
suggested that there should also be a Jemadar, to take charge of the battalion
scouts.
In addition, it is considered that there should be an Indian officer in
command of eachpl&toon, and a senior Subedar in each company headquarters
who will act between the company commander and the platoons in the same
way as the Subedar Major does between the commanding officer and the
Indian officers and men of the battalion.
It is recognised that this will mean an increase of 6 Indian officers over
and above the number proposed by you, but it is considered important to have
them. The transport and scout Jemadars will do away with the necessity for
British officers for these duties and the extra promotions will be valuable as a
reward for good service.
4. As regards Non-Commissioned Officers I consider that there should be
at least 100 ; of whom 49 should be havildars and 51 naiks. This is an increase
of 2 naiks on the number proposed in your War Establishment, but it is
necessary in order to allow of each platoon, having a platoon havildar and each
section a Non-Commissioned Officer.