"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٤٣. الجزء I‏. (من ١ إلى ١٤ نوفمبر ١٩١٧.)" [و‎‎٦‎٥] (٥٠٠/١٣٤)

io/dtLS'Sm Sh me‘“ d I , S,mTKjl Sh °” n “ I ' , “ tod ’ S
telegram 6004, Jaauary Toth (“» 1 slSrS TT”^ Pr “ la " d ' S
ftemtte point of vj „ t J, L, ”'inSi anK Ci,u7d„”7stS
show? it\r d be rSt itio»,h?p an ^f f/ 0 ? 086 ! ali - nmeilt > provided that survey
S^TagTda^ 6 ' thekce " “ ^^cvoss^Euph^e^a^Barrage or
ai - 1 ? 7 ^ ase . n0 a ^ ernfl tive route which would involve anv considerable
amount of bridging is practicable from the urgent military point of view from
which, question is now approached and on whole I am of opinion that the
alignment is very well adapted to meet post bellum requirements of country
Itpmvi.ks reliabie through communication to Baghdad Hy the shortest route
r f h\ Y“ P ° rt Y de demands - Lt win tap rich grain growing land
tl Barrai^’ ° f f ^ Y be by .water to Musafyib or
Snr pfn g ? erb f ?> ^ U !f> abinahyah and Samarrah. It would serve the
holy cities and combined with a Baghdad-Khanikin line it would give long
rww and P r ° fita Y fa °', h . tles for P^gvim traffic (vide paragraph 61, Trade
Commissioner s Report). This is of great importance politically.
,, . t.) Its adoption means that a construction of a railway up the Hai from
JMasinyah to Kut-el-Amarah must be deferred for some years. From the
point ot view of development and pacification, two processes which are
mutually dependent and can most successfully be effected simultaneously this
line is second in importance only to Euphrates line. I would therefore urge
that survey be undertaken forthwith for a raised embanked road from Nasiriyah
o ut-el-Amarah up the Hai, so aligned that it could be adapted for railwav
later on and broad enough for wheeled traffic. The construction of this road
durmg the coming hot weather by local Arab labour under skilled European
supervision would immensely facilitate development of irrigation schemes and
the extension of our influence in this region, and the collection of supplies
■would nave a most favourable political effect.
(4) Attention is invited to possibility of connecting Kut-el-Amarah with
Amarah via the Hai and thence by a chord line to Amarah. This line was
suggested by Willocks and is much shorter than the river route and probably
free from many of its disadvantages.
(5) I would urge importance of complete dredging of Hammar Lake
wnich will give us a much more effective control over Hammar Lake and Suk
istncts, and will give access at all seasons of the year to the Euphrates to
boats from Basrah up to Shinafiyah.
-^ s with reference to Secretary of State’s telegram of January 29th
(Zty. A/ 0 . 8219). b ^
Working copy to G. S. (M. 0. 1 ).
Copy to M. S. C., Q. M. G., A. G., G. S. (S. D. 1 ).
Telegram P., No. 229, dated 1st February 1918. APPENDIX 140
(Received in War Section, 2nd February 1918.) ^ No ^6)
From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station,
To The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.
It is to be regretted that without consulting me the Government of India
je concurred. The wireless station at Basrah is of maritime importance
navaf t ai ] a ,p 0r( \ facilities for military requirements under
naval control .before forming his views did the General Officer Commanding,
le^s E ° rC i e 3” S6e pro P osed a PP eil( fi x 4 to East Indies Wire
less Orders. The General Officer Commanding’s so-called strong reasons
weaken under examination 5 au a
A. Can be done by land stations.
B. Beads improbable in view of Bussian affairs, but answer is a powerful
wireless station at Baghdad not Basrah.
C. ^A powerful station at Baghdad is called for by extension of Force
‘•.D operations.
by ^r 0 ^^ 011 ° f decision is requested and further reasons are being sent