"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٣٣. الجزء II. (من ١٦ إلى ٣٠ أبريل ١٩١٧.)" [و‎‎٦‎٣] (٣٢٠/١٣٠)

Telegram P. ; No. I. A.-3228, dated 21st April 1917. APPENDIX 298
(Despatched 1-50 p.m., received 3 p.m., 21st April 1917.) {By. No 25927)
Prom—The General Officer Commanding, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Baghdad.
(Repeated Director, Military Intelligence, London, Commander-in-Chief in India, Simla.)
From an absolutely reliable source the following has been received.
18th Army Corps informed Mosul on April 19th at 20-30:—
“At 3 p.m., I received to-day’s report from the 33th Army Corps. As it
has always done hitherto the 18th Army Corps will do its duty to the utmost.
As the 13th Army Corps on account of its very extended main posicion on
the Tigris and its lack of transport facilities, with reference to the decision of
operations which are always spreading, can do little, and as the decisive main
operation of the enemy will be (followed ?) in the Tigris sections, the 18th
Army Corps, which as always has to bear brunt of the struggle, has been com
pelled finally to withdraw against its will.
By this the enemy (Pciind* equal feind) will find it possible with his
* Occurs in original. three divisions to compel the whole army
. . to retreat by utilising his position on
interior lines. (? Inform) f 13th Army Corps if the i 8th Army Corps
t Occurs in original. withdraws to Tekrit, then the line of the
. 13th Army Corps would pass through
Bend-Edhaim, Schirwan ale.
13th Army must also withdraw to north without bringing into use any
part of the Army which now (also ?) cannot advance on account of numerous
difficulties, if the 18th Army Corps is compelled to continue its withdrawal
further to north. The 13th Army Corps will, perhaps, in addition, have, in
consequence, the most difficult task of holding the Russians on the Zab River ”
t Occurs in original. $ Remainder very corrupt. Original to
3). M. I. and Baghdad.
i iWorking copy to Gr. S. (M. O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C. (M 0. 1).
APPENDIX 299
(Dy. No. 25928)
Telegram P., No. 32137-Cipher, dated 20th April 1917.
(Despatched 8-40 p.m., received 5 p.m., 21st April 1917.)
From—The Director, Military Intelligence, London,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Baghdad.
(Repeated Commander-in-Chief in India, General Officer Commanding, Egypt, Caucasus
Military Agent and Rowlandson).
On April 14th Maurice reported that on April 2nd it was decided at Cons
tantinople not to try offensive in Mesopotamia. Turks will gradually retire
towards Mosul (Mesopotamia) forming at Makzef (Mukeshefe ?) preliminary
line of defence, at Es Safaria (25 miles north of Tekrit) a second line, 40
kilometres from Mosul (Mesopotamia) a third line strongly fortified. The with
drawal of headquarters to Mosul (Mesopotamia) seems to support the above.
See T. A.-321 (Dy. No. 24672) 3208 (Dy No. 25317), which appears to
refer to 6th Army. 50,000 or 60,000 trained and untrained men, have, according
to reports, been withdrawn from depbts to various field units since Baghdad fell.
12,000 from depots and Caucasus front were according to Maurice, sent towards
Samarra about 28th March from Mosul (Mesopotamia). He now says (April
14th) there are remaining in the depots 80,000, of whom there are fit for im
mediate use 20,000.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., G. S. (M. O. 1 ).
Telegram P., No. 25929, dated 21st April 1917. APPENDIX 300
(Despatched 9-30 p.m.) {By. No. 25929)
From—The Commander-in-Chief in India,
To— General Maude, Baghdad.
Reference in telegram of 17th April, No. 24910 (Dy. No. 24910) to Suspen
sion of Sentences Act in connection with 3rd Brahman case may not be
understood by you. This Act was passed in last session of Indian Legis’a-
tive Council and pamphlet explanatory of the Act was posted you by mail-boat
of April 22nd.