"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٥٢. الجزء II. (من ١٦ إلى ٣٠ نوفمبر ١٩١٨.)" [و‎‎٢‎٦‎٦] (٥٥٨/٥٤٠)

266
APPENDIX 557.
DIARY No. 95630.
Telegram P., No. 10250, dated 24th November 1918.
(Despatched 6-45 ; received 7-0 a.m„ 25th November 1918.)
(Received in War Section, 30th November 1918.)
Prom—The Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Baghdad,
To—The Secretary of State for India.
(Repeated Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department,
Delhi.)
Clear the Line.
For the past few days public here have been among themselves
considering the meaning of Anglo-French declaration of November 8th
and realisation of its probable effect on future of this country is beginning.
Educated opinion is being widely canvassed considerable interest having
teen aroused.
No authority to ascertain public opinion throughout country authoritively
ksyfct been given me and I am unable to speak with certainty on the
subject until this is done.
So far as it has been possible to gauge it in Baghdad under the
above limitations educated opinion is running on the following lines :—
(a) All reject idea of Turkish rule being restored.
(b) An Arabic Kingdom without British advice, assistance or control
is rejected by all.
(c) Formal annexation by British Government is desired by none.
{d) That an Arab state under an Arab Amir including Basrah,
Baghdad and Mosul is on ideal solution is the unanimous
opinion.
(e) All are asking unanimously for a British High Commissioner and
British Adviser in all ministries of Arab states and throughout
the country.
{f) All are unanimously wishing Sir P. Cox to be the first incumbent
of the post. This feeling is general to my personal knou ledge
all over Iraq particularly in the country districts, where Sir
P. Cox’s name carries greatest weight, and in Najaf and
Kerbela.
(gf Before any decision can rightly become to, all agree that the
opinion of the country must be taken and on clear under*
standing on which the inhabitants of the country themselves
rely, that a protectorate will be declared in duo course and
that military administration will continue for the present.
This I am prepared to arrange in a manner not inconsistent
with maintenance of public order and consonant with educated
opinion. That our confidence will be justified by result I
do not doubt.
(h) As to an Amir to be chosen all defer. In this connection the
following names have been mentioned :—
1. Hadi Pasha-al-ITmari.
2. A member of Sultan of Egypt’s family.
3. A son of Sheriff of Mecca.
4. The Naqib of Baghdad.
I have arranged them in order of public preference so far a s
ascertained. As regards Hadi-al-Umari see my next telegram. I do not
know whether he would accept or much about him. Of the four he
seems most eligible candidate and at Mosul whence the family originally
sprang he would be specially welcome.
As to second proposal I am not sufficiently conversant with Egyptian
affairs to express an opinion.
Tliird proposal I am now advised would in Baghdad meet with wide-
spr< arl acceptance and because all know who the Sheriff is it would probably
be well received outside. It is also considered that he would be acceptable
to Shiahs on account of Sheriff’s well-known latitude in religious views.
I am however strongly opposed to it for reasons connected with Persian Gulf
and Central Arabia politics and on other grounds.
The Naqib, the 4th candidate, is now, I think, backed by bis persona^
following only. His failing health and great age, his progeny’s ineffectiveness
and bad reputation and the usurious instinct the whole family display
as landlords disqualify him, and his successors on personal grounds for the
post. On political grounds he represents Sunnie in (group undecypherable)
as against Shiahs and carries little personal weight.
In Basrah and in Mosul he is quite unknown. In politics he has
never taken an active part or interest but rather has confined himself to
diplomatic duty enforced on him by his position, of keeping in touch
with each successive Government in Baghdad.