"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». مجلد ٤١. الجزء II. (من ١٦ إلى ٣١ ديسمبر ١٩١٧." [و‎‎١‎٢‎٨] (٥٠٨/٢٦٠)

6. Persia .—The political situation in Tehran is very unstable. On the
19th Sir C. Marling reported that a
democratic Cabinet under Mukhbar-es-
iultaneh, who is said to be practically pledged to break off relations with us,
j inevitable if we do not take immediate steps to prevent it.
The armistice treaty concluded between Turks and Russia apparently
g6913 includes a clause that both Turkey and
Russia are willing to withdraw their
troops from Persia.
On 20th December Sir 0. Marling reported that the Persian Government
had asked the British Government to
withdraw their troops from Persia.
The Poreign Office have wired the decisions of His Majesty's Government
as to policy in Persia, which comprise
briefly :—
(?!) insurances to Shah regarding his personal safety and a pension, if
deposed.
86929.
87375.
(ii) Assurances to Vossck-ed-Dowleh regarding financial assistance to a
friendly Persian Government.
(Hi) Promise to consider favourably after the war the formation of a
uniform force for the whole of Persia in w r hich the South Persia
Rifles will be eventually incorporated. The retention of British
Officers in the South Persia Rifles at least for the duration of the
war and for 6 months after its termination is insisted upon.
(iv) Agreement regarding the Anglo-Russian Convention is in suspense;
its formal cancellation being dependent on the concurrence of a
properly constituted government in Russia.
7. General conclusions .—The political situation in Persia at the present
aoment is most unstable. It remains to be seen how far His Majesty’s
lovernment declaration of policy will steady matters to our benefit.
Prom the military point of view, if we could rely on Germany’s word to
respect the neutrality of Persia, there would be certain advantages in with
drawing our troops. But can wm trust Germany ?
At present we are faced wdth three possible further military commitments
in Persia.
(i) The taking over by Porce “ D ” of the Khanikin-Hamadan road ;
(ii) The extension of the sphere of the South Persia Rifles to Ispahan ;
(Hi) The extension of the cordon from Khwash to Birjand northward to
Meshed.
(Sd.) P. E. G. T.,—24-12-17.
The Persian question has reached a stage which obliges us to reconsider
our military policy there.
The problem of preventing Turko-German penetration is complicated by-
supply and transport difficulties, by the mischievous Maximalist activities and
by our desire to cultivate better relations with Persians and Bakhtiaris.
Our experience of the Russian revolution warns us not to expect too
much from the reported movement for a stable and separate government by
the Ukraine, Cossack and Caucasus Provinces or that it will present a real
barrier to the Maximalists and to German aggression and propaganda. These
combined with Baratoff’s difficulties, and the impotence of the Persian Govern
ment, seem likely to necessitate an extension of the sphere of Porce “ D ”
m. o.,—24-12-17. and tbe South Pe^ia Rifles. It is at
present difficult to see the exact limits of
this sphere.
Such commitments as are indicated will give rise to demands for transport
which we may find difficult to meet having regard to N. W. P. requirements
The outlook in this direction is not improved by the news that German
prisoners of war at Tashkent have been assisting the Maximalists.
These prisoners may afford a convenient means of embarrassino* us j u
Afghanistan, which the Germans will be likely to take advantage of, if they
can ; as such a move involves no risk to German operations elsewhere.
(Sd.) P. J. M.,—24-12-17.