"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٣٨. الجزءان ١ و٢. (من ١ إلى ٣٠ سبتمبر ١٩١٧)." [و‎‎٣‎٦‎٦] (١٠٠٠/٧٣٦)

336
requested that the managing agent of Messrs. Duncan Stratton and Company,
Marine Street, Bombay, be approached with a view to purchase. Flour milling
expert to advise technically is being sent to India.
Working copy to Q.M.G.
Copy to M.S.C., M.A.G., D.G.M.W., G.S. (M.O. i, M.O. 3).
Telegram P., No. X.-3799, dated 24th September 1917. APPENDIX 4:51
(Despatched 11-45 P.M., received 8-30 P.M., 25th September 1917.) (Dy. No. 64953).
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D, u Baghdad,
To—The Secretary, War Office, London.
(Repeated C. G. S,, and Communications.)
In reply to 4i658«Cipher Q. M Q.-6 of 20th (Dy. No. 63979).
Arrangements are being made for contracts for total quantities. Quality
3 classes, viz., Malawi, Khadarwi and Sayir. Maximum prices to grower are
fixed by proclamation issued by political after consulting leading merchants
and growers Prices per ton F. 0 . B. Malawi rupees 290. Khadrawi rupees
270, Sayir rupees 240. They will be packed in the usual date boxes, of which
there is a shortage, supplemented by empty boxes collected from supply depots.
East African shipments will be sent direct in two consignments. For re
mainder, such quantity as will not delay clearing from Basrah, will be loaded
on every transport and storeship returning to Bombay. Dates must be cleared
before the January rains. They must be stored in Bombay, where arrange*
ments for storage have been made. 20,000 additional tons can be supplied).
Telegram P., No. 41847-Cipher, dated 24th September 1917. APPENDIX 452
(Despatched 6-40 P.M., received 8-30 P.M., 25th September 1917.) (Dy. No. 649569
From—The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Baghdad.
(Repeated C.-in-C. in India.)
Your X.-3750, dated 21st September (Dy. No. 64232).
For the past six months, my telegrams have consistently discountea Rus
sian assistance in Mesopotamia and I have never given any indication that I
depended on it and therefore our plans do not appear to. me to be material y
Effected at present by recent developments on the Russian front. I still think
it desirable to try to obtain such assistance as possible from the Russians and
you should continue your efforts to get Baratoff on to the Dialha. I am again
telegraphing on the subject to Russian Headquarters, for the Russian troops
must exercise a certain amount of influence on the enemy so long as they remain
in being, as they would upon us if we were in the enemy s place.
Working copy to Q.M.G,
Copy to M,S.C.
Regarding the general question, the strength of the enemy s attack wil /
depend upon the fighting condition of the .Turks and the efficiency of enemy
communications. The Turks have been at war some years and are known to be
wa” weary and they are not well equipped bat no doubt Falkenhayn w .11 try o
tret the best he can out of them. You should make every effort to obtain
Further information regarding the progress of hostile communications ; ours is
neither definite nor recent. But the railway may yet be some loo miles from
Mosul whence the distance to your front is still some IS o miles, while river
communication is bad. The Turks can, no doubt, live upon the country to a
„r e at extent but artillery, ammunition and other war material require goo ,
communications. You possess an advantage in this 3 ® Ct ’,^ n ^"^bTe'to
especially as regards artillery ammunition supply, should be very valuab
you? I think that, on the whole, you should be well able o w.thst and w, h t
Russian assistance, any attack that the enemy is capable of making this year.
/ Later on you may possibly require reinforcements.