"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٣٨. الجزءان ١ و٢. (من ١ إلى ٣٠ سبتمبر ١٩١٧)." [و‎‎٣‎٢‎٧] (١٠٠٠/٦٥٨)

C, . offensive is desirable, too, if only from the point of view of restoring j
Russian troops'to fighting efficiency, as it is common knowledge that troops
whose morale is low usually continue to deteriorate so long as they are mac ive.
The unreliability of even the undertakings of Russian commanders now
p P ms evident. You will remember that last spring when we entered Baghdad
the Russian Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus gave a distinct promise of a
• 0 ff e[ s | ve w hich never materialised. This promise has recently been
renewed and varying dates in September and 0ct ^ ber 1 have , b ^ en f \ Xed
commencement cooperations. It is proposed now ^ the eleventh hour to wuthhold
m-cneration except to ;uch an extent as will benefit the (? Russians). I nave not
caused m expia'in ? to Prjevelski that, provided Baratoff moves early enough, he
Should be able to regain the line of the Dialha but that the chances of his force
reachin® Kifri would"be remote unless the (? Russians) first occupied Suleiman
yeh and is advance were supported by the ? Russians) from this direction and by
the British from Shahraban. The opponents of this force, apart from any re nforce-
Lents that the enemy might bring down would be the second and sixth Ditn-
sions two sturdy Turkish Divisions which would readil) keep it m ^check.
Moreover, although the force could be supplied by us from Baqubah rua Shah-
taban whilst the line of the Dialha was being temporarily held pending the
advance on Kifri, assurance of such supply during permanent occupation
of that line would be another matter since the line of supply womd he close
to and in prolongation of its battle front. It seems to me that under tne Pr ese "‘
akered circumstance this column, with its low fighting efficiency .s an encumbrance
rather than an assistance, since we should constantly be called upon to extnca.e
it from tactical as well as supply difhculties.
In effect, the situation is now changed to the extent that the Russians in
tend to adopt, instead of a limited offensive in co-operation with ourselves a pas
sive defensive which if prolonged has in war usually only one result, buch ac ion
by the Russians would considerably limit offensive uction on our part tho ^
should still lose no opportunity of striking as occasion offered, bm the adec iuacy
for this purpose of the force at my disposal is a question for consideration w
the probability of an ultimate offensive by the enemy in superior numbers,
which offensive I shall have to meet, possibly simultaneously on three fronts,
namely, Dialha, Tigris and Euphrates I shall endeavour to keep reserves^n
hand ready to move to any threatened point at short no c vinous
ultimately be possible when the enemy dose m and communication, betw een various
parts of our front, though improving rapidly, are still misuited for sp^ y
movement of troops from front to front There have been mdications from ^m^
to time in correspondence with London and India that adduionaUroops aie be. ,,
prepared for despatch to this country should the situation demand t.. ,
appears that the Russians have no definite plans and replies from hemi are a d
ti obtain; moreover, Russian backwardness at Kermanshab exposing our right
flank considerably increases our anxieties in this direction.
I submit therefore that the moment has arrived when we should cease to
depend on such unreliable allies, whilst still urging them to any offensive ac,
tion oossible • I would a-k also that such additional troops as may ha available
shmdd be nl’aced at my disposal to replace deficiency caused by Russian
deffiedo^, ^,ch additional troops being ^plete with ^
I am still reluctant, as hitherto, to ask for these and have ed doing so as
as 1 justifiably could, but 1 feel bound to look ahead, althoagn, apa.ttron
Russian fiasco, all goes well and we are brimful of confidence.
Working copy to M.S.V., G.S. (M.O. i)
Copy to M.S.C., G.S. (S.D. 3).
Telegram P„ No. X, 3 753 , dated »»d September .9.7. AP ‘ ,EN „ L '^ ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *
(Despatched 11-5 A.M., received 6-15 P u , aand September 1917.)
From-The G. O. C, Force " D, M Baghdad,
To—The Secretary, War Office, London.
(Repeated Thief of the General Staff, Simla.)
Can vou provide one additional British General Hospital which I fin 1
necessary owing to recent increase of this force ? For the immediate despat