"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٣٧. الجزء II. (من ١٦ إلى ٣١ أغسطس ١٩١٧)." [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٠] (٥٤٦/٤٤٤)

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50 each gloves, armguards, masks and waterproof aprons for mineral
water factories.
Working copy to M. S. C., D. G. M. W„ A. G., Q. M. G., D. G. O.
Copy to A. D. (Marine), D. M. S., G. S. T. 1, S. D. 3).
Telegram P., No. 58^95, dated 30th August 1917. APPENDIX 544
(Despatched 1-50 p m.) (Zty. No. 58895)
From—The War Section, Army Headquarters, Simla,
To—The Inspector General of Communications, Force “D, ” Basrah.
Clear line.
Reference General Officer Commanding, Force “D,” Baghdad No. X.-
3146 (Z)y. No. 54602), dated 10th August,
For Supply and Transport you have allotted for September fuel 10,721
tons, fodder 12,709 tons, other supplies 25,860 tons. Of these all fuel, fodder and
approximately 17,360 tons of othe rsupplies must be loaded at Karachi, which
leave only 8,500 tons from Bombay. Up to the present no detailed demand
has been received from Director, Supply and Transport, so unable to load any
thing exactly to his order in Bamora which sails 3rd September. Shall fill up
Bamora as deemed most suitable, if demands not received here within 24 hours.
Record copy to Q. M. G.
Telegram P., No. T.-B -49, dated 29th August 1917. APPENDIX 545
(Despatched 11-40 a.m., received 8 a.m., SOth August 1917.) (Dy. No. 58908)
From—Caumilage, Chtabkaw Armii,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force u D,” Baghdid.
(Repeated Director, Military Intelligence, London and India.)
The following is for General Maude:— Begins. Your telegram No.
X.-3321 {By. No. 57305) oi August 23rd The execution of the operation
towards Mosul depends entirely on the preparation of the rear as I informed
you in my last telegram (By. No. 57900), and the feasibility of the comple
tion of this preparation determines the date the operation could commence.
I can only commence the main offensive from the front Urumiyah—Bane
at the end of October, being thus dependent on the preparation of the rear.
I cannot begin operations earlier than that without risking an unsatisfac
tory decision—this I emphatically submit.
The troops on the left flank of the main Caucasus Army will assume the
offensive on the front Mush—Bitlis as a demonstration, in the middle of October,
in order to facilitate the execution of the main offensive and to divert the
Mosul group of the Turkish forces. The troops of the 1st Caucasus Cavalry
Corps, which are intended for the occupation of the Dialha line and for transfer
to your command, will begin to move to that river at the same time.
The main offensive will commence at the end of October from the front
Neri (corrupt spelling group) U—I sheikh (east of Rayat)—Serdesht—Bane,
against the line Rizan—Rowanduz—Rania—Suleimaniyeh, after these two
preliminary offensive operations on the flanks.
It is essential to keep the following considerations in view, with regard to
this operation. The base for the entire Turkish 6th Army operating against
both the Russians and the British is Mosul.
Our troops will be at half the distance from Mosul that Samarra is, when
they move to the line Bizan—Rowanduz, and the Turkish troops w hich are ope
rating from Mosul towards the south will be so seriously threatened by them,
that the Turks will be compelled to turn all their attention in the direction of
Rowanduz.
Therefore the Turks could leave a holding force down in the South and
could fall with all their concentrated force on the group of Bussian troops which
are advancing from the direction of Urumiyah, unless the British also advance
at the same time.
Therefore it would be more advisable that there should he a simultaneous
advance by:—
(a) The Russian main forces against the line Rizan—Suleimaniyeh
from the front Neri—Bane.