ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ٨ "بلاد الرافدين: الوضع" [و‎‎٤‎٥‎٨] (٩٩٥/٩٢٩)

(P 5408) From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 10th July 1920. ' )
(Repeated to Viceroy.)
(Received 12 th, 11 a.m.)
(R.) 8312. Your telegram dated 8 th July. Additional Indian divisions for
Mesopotamia :—
( 1 ) I submit brief appreciation of the (? situation), which please read in light of
my previous official telegrams on the subject which I have no reason substantially to
modify. You are aware that General, Baghdad, has asked that a brigade may be
held in readiness as a first instalment against possible eventualities.
(2) As in (? 1918) so now military position in Mesopotamia is conditioned by
external rather than by internal situation. Principal external factors are Bolsheviks,
Turks and Syrians in order named.
(3) Bolsheviks cannot, in my opinion, be adequately dealt with (? by) force based
on Mesopotamia. Proper military means of dealing with them appears to me to be
(if I may venture an opinion) from Batoum by a force in Caucasus and on Caspian.
His Majesty’s Government found themselves compelled to abandon this line last year,
and results have reacted unfavourably on us in Persia.
(4) I am not well informed as to Turkish situation, but so far as I can judge,
action the Allies are taking on European side is likely if sustained to preclude any
serious Turkish offensive against Mesopotamia.
(5) Syrian situation is, I venture to think, susceptible of improvement by diplo
matic rather than by military ■ means. I incline to view that if Syrian affairs were
now detached completely from Egypt and Palestine, and were dealt with by Consular
Officer at Damascus with subordinate at Aleppo working directly under Whitehall
and devoting his whole time to Syrian problems, we should have less trouble than we
are now having, and I respectfully submit this proposal for consideration. French
have Consul at Baghdad and have Vice-Consulate at Basrah (at present vacant), and
there seems no reason why we should be less well represented in Syria.
( 6 ) Internal situation in Mesopotamia is threatening, but will very greatly
improve so soon as the external situation has been stabilised. Present troubles and
those likely to occur in near future arise first from fact that those who fish in troubled
waters are taking advantage of instability of the external situation to cause dis
turbances here, whilst minds of population at large are confused by declaration of
His Majesty’s Government which so widely diverge, if I may be allowed to say so,
from realities of life in Mesopotamia, that they find no degree of popular acceptance
outside the towns, and have hitherto done little but arouse (? suspicion) even there.
(7) Immediate emergencies confronting us on Euphrates could have been
promptly nipped in the bud had existing armed forces in Mesopotamia been in a
more efficient state than they now are. We do not really require more units at
present. What we chiefly want is to have existing units brought up to strength in
personnel and equipment. At present moment, though we were promised three
squadrons in Mesopotamia by 15th April, Royal Air Force are unable to keep more
than 16 machines in air in Mesopotamia and Persia or to make more than six available
for any single operation during this critical period.
Armoured cars cannot be sent out of Baghdad owing to weakness or inefficiency
of personnel. Tanks have been refused us.
( 8 ) British units in country contain such large proportion of immature and
almost untrained young soldiers that they cannot be used for operations during the
hot weather, whole brunt of which falls on the Indian regiments.
Some of the Indian regiments supplied from India recently are much below
strength, and I am credibly informed that half of the regiment which recently arrived
at Basrah had not finished their first musketry course and there were insufficiency of
trained men in regiment to man its Lewis guns.
Every military department in subordinate Mesopotamia is greatly below strength
in personnel. British units in the country are consequently further depleted in order
to meet the essential departmental needs, with the result that some units cannot
parade more than 300 strong.
Motor transport in the country is worn out and of low efficiency. When, for
example, urgent call was made for (? current) operations on the 50 reserve lorries at
the railhead of Quraitu it was found that only eight were serviceable. Defence
vessels are unreliable. .
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