ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ٨ "بلاد الرافدين: الوضع" [ظ‎‎١‎٤‎٧] (٩٩٥/٣٠٥)

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No. 0/2138/791.
General Headquarters,
Mes. Ex. Force,
Baghdad, 22nd August, 1920.
Telegram—(P.) Secret.
To—Troopers.
Ho. X/9901 (0/2/38/791).
Dated 21st August, 1920.
I have received from the Civil Commissioner an appreciation of the present
situation which he will submit to the India Office, on the following lines.
Begins:—“ The position in the Ramadi District inspires no great confi
dence. Ramadi should not be left before Mosul, as this would render with
drawal from Mosul almost impossible and would bring in large tribal areas
against us. The positions at Arbil and Sulaimaniyah are likely to deteriorate
in sympathy with situations elsewhere. Indications of future deterioration of
the situation exists in the Qaraghan, Kifri, Tuz, Tauq area. As regards
JBa c qubah, reports indicate that there are some 4,000 rebels opposed to us and
an advance to Khaniqin will render us liable to attack by perhaps 4,000 more.
These have the Persian market at their back both for arms and ammunition.
The Samarra Division is slowly becoming more disturbed. Although there is
little fresh information from the Kirmanshah District, the Civil Commissioner
considers that serious trouble during the next three months is probable, parti-
•cularly in October. The present force on this line is insufficient. Our first
duty is to open, and then keep open, our line of communication with Persia,
and to enable this to be done it is necessary to have a division in the area be
tween Baghdad and Kirmanshah. If another Division (the leading troops
•of which should arrive in six weeks) is not possible, the requirements of policy
demand withdrawal from Mosul.
This is on the assumption that at the expense of material and prestige, it
will be practically possible to withdraw troops to Baghdad and to transfer
them to the Diyalah line.
A withdrawal from Kirkuk is not recommended until operations along the
Diyalah Line re-open the line to Kifri. Ends.
I am in general agreement with the Civil Commissioner’s statement of
the dilation, as regards the existing conditions which are stated above, but I
think his numbers give probably an excessive estimate of the opposition prob
able in the Ba‘qubah-Khaniqin Area.
As regards withdrawal from Mosul, I considered this possibility on 15th
-July, and I informed you accordingly, but fuller investigations J <.w that the
difficulty of the operation and the length of time involved in carrying* it out
make it impracticable and the probable results in additional disturbances are
likely to do more than counteract the advantage.
The rapid spread of the rebellion in the Shamiyah and Hillah Divisions
which endangered Baghdad where only two untried battalions formed the
•garrison, with a perimeter of 16 miles to defend, compelled me to draw on the
troops from Baiji.
Strong protection of the Bag h d ad - S h arqa t line will be entailed by the
withdrawal from Mosul, so as to enable the troops moving down to be supplied,
and particularly so of the Baiji-Sharqat portion which is a waterless section
over which troops will have to be transported. This was rendered impossible
by my having to withdraw the troops from Baiji and I do not consider that I
can withdrdaw the force from Mosul unless I can send a strong force to hold the
railway. To do this would prevent the Persian line being re-opened, or any
active measures being taken to restore peace elsewhere. I feel therefore, com
pelled to put aside the idea of withdrawing from Mosul. The arrival of the
troops at present being sent from India will I hope enable me to prevent the
spread of the disturbances on the Euphrates further south than Xasiriyah,
and also to concentrate a force of approximately a Division (less one brigade)
for operations on the Persian Line. This however presupposes the adoption
•of the defensive again on the Hillah-Hindiyah barrage line with a reduced
force. I have asked in my telegrams Ho. 0/2138/738 of 17th August and
0/2138/674 of 13th August, that three British and three Indian Battalions in
addition to the force now being sent from India may be sent here. If these
are sent so as to continue the present flow of troops, will enable me to—
( 1 ) make more sure of the position of the Hasiriyah-Samawah line
( 2 ) strengthen my communications and
( 3 ) add to my mobile force in the vicinity of Baghdad.
The remaining Indian battalions of a division, i.e., seven without more
divisional or brigade staffs or artillery and engineers would enable me to secure
my base at Basrah and also to adopt an active role in two directions at one
time. Such reinforcements which amounts to less than two divisions would be
less than half those foreshadowed in your telegram Ho. 82093/Cypher/M.O.2
of 4th Hovember, 1919.
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