"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٢٢. الجزء II‏. (من ١٦ إلى ٣١ مايو ١٩١٦.)" [و‎‎٩‎٩] (٢٤٦/٢٠٢)

J
»
■r
along length of the river where any difficulties occur, and this will receive
attention.
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., M. S V., G. S. (M. 0. 2, M. 0. 3).
Telegram P., No. 129-446-0., dated 27th May 1916. APPENDIX 393
(Despatched 0-5 a.m., 28th May 1916, received 9-50 a.m., 29th May 1916.) {Dy, Mo. 56582)
Prom—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
May 27th, Tigris Line.
A report has been received from Gorringe to say that on the left bank
there is a considerable movement of the enemy indicating further withdrawals
from Sannaiyat to positions in rear but the Turks still hold Sannaiyat. Artil
lery and aircraft have been very active on both sides and bombs have been
dropped.
A report from the 3rd Division states that a man has been captured, who
declares he is a French soldier of Morocco nationality, was captured at Arras
by the Germans, sent to Constantinople and forced to join the Turkish Army,
Addressed India ; repeated London.
Working copy to G. S. (M. 0. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., M. S. V., G. S. (M. O. 2, M. 0. 3), F. and P.
Telegram P., No. 1636-7-Q., dated 28th May 1916. APPENDIX 394
(Despatched 4-15 p.m., received 10-45 a.m., 29th May 1916.) {Ty. No. 56620)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D, ” P>asrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
Your 55945 of 25th May. Following can be made available for Qurnah-
Amarah railway. About 15 miles of 2 ft. 6 ins. permanent way with propor
tionate amount of stock.
Working copy to Q. M. G.
Copy to M. S. C., M. S. V., Railway Board, G. S, (M, 0. 1).
Telegram P., No. 1162-1-0., dated 28th May 1916. APPENDIX 395
(Despatched 5-55 p.m., received 10-45 a.m., dated 29th May 1916.) (Dy. No. 56622)
Prom—The General Officer Commanding, Force ce D , 31 Basrah,
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
56079, May 26th.
1. With reference to 2nd paragraph. Glad as I should be to put your
suggestion into effect, the attachment of officers to headquarters for instruction
is scarcely feasible as units are already so depleted of efficient and fully trained
officers. Already where officers can be spared from units they are attached as
staff captains to Brigades for instruction.
2. With reference to 3rd paragraph. A larger staff than the headquarters
of the corps required under normal conditions in other theatres is made neces
sary by the conditions under which the 3rd Army Corps is operating as a prac
tically independent force of 4 divisions, a cavalry brigade, and considerable
number of corps xroops because in the former case a corps consists generally
of 3 divisions at the most, and is connected by rapid means of transport with
headquarters of its army and is in close touch with other corps.