"الوضع في بلاد فارس، المجلد I" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٨] (٣٥٣/٣٣٩)

[P 3760]
From Viceroy, Army Department, 20th September 1917.
(Received 21st, 10 a.m.)
14121. A\ e desire to review existing conditions in Rerjsia in the light of
enemy plans communicated to us in your telegram of the 3rd instant and
your telegram of the 6th instant.
(2) It seems improbable that Russia will be able to hinder effectively the
enemy plans either by diplomacx 7 or force and on this assumption we
appreciate enemy execution of his plan as follows :—
(1) Movement on a broad front using any or all of routes via Azerbaijan
to J ehran ; via passes south of Lake Urumia to Uamadan and via
Kasr-i-Shirin to Hamadan.
(2) A concentration in the area ol Hamadan-Tehran whence roads lead
first v/d I ehran and Meshed to Herat; secondly, via Ispaban-
Nain-Gunabau to Kain ; thirdly, via Ispahan-Yezd-Kerman-
Bam to Seistan and the Helmand. Of these want of supplies
prohibits use of number two for anything but patrols. Number
one is the best supplied, is the furthest from British influence, and
is the shortest way to Herat, number three disturbs - Bakhtiaris
and South Persia, districts likely to provide levies and recruits to
the invading force, but presents supply difficulties.
(3) Movement on Afghanistan either in force or in small parties or most
probably both.
3. Io counter this plan the political means at our disposal seems to us
to be a change of polic} 7 in Persia. The only prospect of rendering the
Persian Government at once disposed and in a position to co-operate with us
in hindering the enemy’s plans seems to lie in our being able to demonstrate
that so far from harbouring designs on Persia’s independence we sincerely
desire in our own interests to see her self-sufficient and strong. A change of
policy on the lines already advocated by us on political grounds seems to us
therefore a pressing military necessity. This may seem Utopian at this late
hour but we may be able the more easily to influence through subsidies and
other inducements the Bakhtiaris, Soulet and Qawam, Farman Farma and
other Persian leaders to support us.
4. ihe military precautions now possible are (a) the development of
our intelligence system throughout western Persia, and in this the support
ol local notables suggested above will much assist; (/>) the effective recog
nition of the South Persia Rifles by the Persian Government as a direct
result of (3) with a view to securing their subsequent co-operation with us
in support of our joint interests. We might endeavour to surmount
Persia’s objections to South Persia Rifles in so far as these are based on
trust to amour propre by agreeing to a Persian General in command, with
competent British officers as advisers ; (c) the improvement of communications
in wirch connection we are addressing you once more about the extension oT
Dalbaidin Railway to Marjawa, while a project for the betterment of Bunder
Abbas-Saidabad-Kerman road is now with you.
5. Now that information is hardening as to the imminence of hostilities
penetrating Persia and of that country becoming a war area, the tranquility
of India and her front,iers depends on prompt and adequate co-ordination
and utilisation of all our potentialities in Persia, whether political or
military. W e believe time has now come to regard Persia as a war area in
which all action and policy should be co-ordinated under direct control of
the War Cabinet.