"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٤‎٣‎١] (١٣٨٦/٨٧٢)

The ah vantages'of this position are: —
“ (1) Its commanding nilitan r value. ,
“ (2) The control it gives us of the whole navigable ’waterway to the Gulf. 1
4f (3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the sea.
(4) The fact that it completely covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it from
Turkish intrigues or incursions.
“ (5) The moral effect on thn Arabs.
l ’ (6) The control of the Olograph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates.
A lien we have reached Kurna and fully established ourselves there it will be time
enough to consider whether we should go further.”
Lord Crewe, in telegraphing 1
ram Ko. 57. dated 27th November
1 Tele
191 k
his' sanction for this move, expressly
stated that he was not disposed to
authorise an advance to Baghdad as had
been suggested in certain quarters, and
limited our operat'.ons to Kurna. The main considerations which governed
itis decision wore the fact,that our available military forces at that period
were only one Division, and that our limited resources in river shipping and
the dilficulties of navigation at that season, practically precluded any further
advance for the time being - .
10. The operations against Kurna were begun on the 3rd December and
culminated on the 9th December in the surrender of that town, together
with the late Vali of Dasrah, J TOO prisoners and nine guns. (hir authority
was thus established over the whole of the rich riverain tract between
Kurna and the sea, and also over the whole waterway navigable by Gulf
steamers, Kurnu being the limit of such navigation.
Hy Christmas 1914 events had talien a somewhat disquieting turn.
From information received it became obvious that the Turks intended if
possible to retrieve the situation in Mesopotamia, and by the end of
January jt was evident that they were collecting forces, not only to attack
us at Kurna and Basra, but'also to threaten the oil fields in the Bakhtiari
Bills, a movement which involved a Turkish invasion of Persian territory,
Consequently, on the 27th Januaiy Lord Crewe despatched a telegram to
the Viceroy authorising the immediate despatch of the 12th Brigade.
“ As thoi’s are indications of increasing Turko-Arab menace both on Tigris and on
Euphrates, also of a possible early attack on the pipe line near Almaz, whilst Turkish
reinforcements we know.are being sent to Baghdad.”
At the same time Lord Crewe approached the Foreign Office on the subject’
of sending a force to the Kanin Valley to protect the pipe, limy and thus
in lirectly safeguard the oil fields. The Foreign Office communicated with
Teheran and explained that “His Majesty’s Government were compelled to'
“ take measures for the defence of their interests and property in default of
“ any effective Persian force sufficient to guarantee those regions against
k- Turkish invasion.” The Persian Government tacitly acquiesced in the
proposed action.
11 . At the end of January 191b the general position was somewhat as
follows : —AtXasariyeh Turks and Arabs were collecting for an attack on Basra
by the desert route to Zobeir. In the Kurna direction the Turks were in
considerable force, but unlikely to attack owing to the strength o r the Kurna
position. On the Karun side the menace was becoming formidable, the*
Turks were approaching, dchad was being widely preached and the Arab
trib:\snien were ripe for an armed rising against the Sheikh of Muhammerah
and ourselves. At the time we had approximately a Brigade in a strong
defensive position at Kurna, and two Brigades at and around Basra, while a
fourth Brigade was being got‘ready for embarkation in India. British
subjects had been withdrawn from Aliwaz and the Comet and Shashan had
been sent up the Karim to give moral support to the Vice-Consul and
our adherents at Aliwaz. This, however, did not satisfy the Secretary
,)■' State as sufficient considering the importance of the pipe line, the
vital necessity of preventing die spread of Jthad- into Persian Arabistan’
and the urgency of asserting our military superiority at the head of the
Gulf. Accordingly on the 1st February lie despatched a telegram to the
Viceroy emphasizing the dangers of the situation.
MS 236 31