"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٤‎٠‎٥] (١٣٨٦/٨١٩)

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remained with the Secretary of State. The consequence of this diminished
facts^and'h’is 6 ^ 1 !'!' 8 !^n ^ la *", t ^ e ^dia Office is not in possession of all the
tacts and has to ieJy on sucli telegraphic evidence as is before it.
Id. Major-General lownshend arrived from India on the 22nd April and
took over command of the 6th Division. On the 24th Sir Johif Nixon
c nected him to proceed at once to Kurna to reconnoitre the Turkish
position north of that place and to torm a plan of attack. The contemplated
operations took time to materialize, and, in fact, the advance op the Tigris
dnl not commence till the 31st May. Meanwhile the situation had developed
on the Karim side, and it will be convenient to turn thereto before continuing
the narrative ol the advance to Amara.
Immediately after the conclusion of the Shaiba operations Sir J. Nixon
m accordance with Lord Crewe’s instructions, took steps to deal with the
situation on the Karun. Major-General Gorringe was directed to reopen
communications with Ahwaz and disperse the enemy, who were estimated
to consist of about eight battalions of Turkish regulars and some 7,000 Arab
tribesmen. On General Gorringe’s advance the Turks retreated north of the
Narkheh river, which was crossed by us early in May, but too late to
intercept them in their retirement towards Amara. Asa result of Genera 1
Gorringe’s operations Persian Arabistan was cleared of the enemy and
the Arab tribes forced to submit, thus enabling the pipe line to be repaired
and normal conditions to be resumed at the oil fields.
16. On the 26th May General Nixon telegraphed direct to the Secretary of
State asking lor definite orders as to his proposed advance to Amara. In the
meantime Mr. Chamberlain had taken over the India Office. Lord Crewe had
given his consent to the advance to Amara with some reluctance. His view was
that we were chiefly concerned with the maintenance of a secure base at Basra
and the safety of our important interests in the oilfields. The India Office
had been constantly reminded of those interests by the Admiralty while it
was not without its own anxieties. It knew that in the circumstances of the
moment in Europe no military assistance could reasonably be expected from
the War Office. It recognised that India could send no further reinforce
ments, and though it was fully aware of the strategic and other advantages
of holding the ligris \ alley up to Amara, it was doubtful of our capacity
to do so if the Turks mustered in force to attack us there. It was felt
however, by Mr. Chamberlain that it was difficult to reject the considered
opinion of those on the spot who were obviously in a better position to judge
than we were of the local conditions and the relative strength and value of
the opposing forces.
The operations that ensued were carried out by General Townshend with
two Brigades. On the 3rd June Amara was reached and the garrison
capitulated.
1 /. \\ ith the occupation of Amara and the submission of all the tribes in
the Karun valley, the gallant Mesopotamian Field Force might, without
reproach, have rested on its laurels during the blazing and enervatino-
summer, but General Nixon, with the support of the Government
ot India deemed it inexpedient 4o remain inactive whilst any Turks
were within striking distance, he therefore next directed his activities
towards the Euphrates side. There had been naval reconnaissances up the
Euphrates channels both from Basra and Kurna, which indicated an
eventual offensive movement in that direction, but the first positive
intimation on the subject received at the India Office was the telegram from
the \ iceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 13th June 1915.
I he view of the situation set forth therein was accepted by Mr. Chamber-
lain, as though the broken Turkish force at Nasiriyeh could scarcely be
regarded as a menace to us, it was thought- that it might offer a rallying
point to I urkish reinforcements from Baghdad, in which case Basra might
possi dI} >e again threatened from the west, while unquestionably we could
not expect the Arabs on the Euphrates to side with us so long as they
had a I urkish garrison in their midst. J