"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [ظ‎‎٤‎٠‎٤] (١٣٨٦/٨١٨)

6
Developments came quickly. The Arabs in the Kanin ^ rose m
rebellion against the Sheikh of Muhammerah. On the 17th Sir Arthur
Barrett reported that he had sent a column under Brigadier-General
Delamain to check the Turkish advance north-west of Shaiba. On the same
date skirmishes were reported 11 miles north-west of Ahwaz between our
cavalry patrols and Arabs. The pipe line was cut in several places, and the
manager at the Abadan works reported that the supply of oil stored at
Abadan would be exhausted before the middle of March, bach day things
looked blacker. On the 21st February, Army Headquarters in India
telegraphed that 3,000 Turks with 18 guns and numerous Arab horsemen
from Nasariyeh were approaching Basra from the north-west. Lord Crewe
accordingly on the 23rd telegraphed to the Viceroy an expression of his
opinion that Force t; D ” should be at once increased to a strength of two
divisions. Reinforcements, however, took time to arrive, and meanwhile
there was fighting both in the Karun Valley and near Shaiba, 14 miles
west of Basra. Altogether the situation appeared critical.
12. On the 7th March, in compliance with the orders of the Secretary of
State, the Viceroy reported that he was sending the 33rd Brigade from
India. By the 10th March the War Office had made arrangements for the
despatch of an Indian Brigade from Egypt. This with the 12th and
33rd Brigades practically constituted the Second Division for which Lord
Crewe had so repeatedly pressed. There was now some prospect of our
having sufficient forces to meet the various dangers which loomed in front
of us. Happily the Karun danger had partially dissipated itself and we
escaped further serious trouble in that direction. Meantime the menace
from the Euphrates side was rapidly increasing.
On the 1st April we were informed that the Government of India had
decided to reorganise the Force in Mesopotamia and had appointed General
Sir John Nixon to the Command. On the 9tb that officer landed at Basra
and General Barrett was invalided home.
On the 12th and 13th there was considerable fighting round Shaiba. On
the 14th the decisive victory of Barjisiyah was gained and the whole Turkish
Army put to flight. This brilliant engagement resulted in clearing what
may be styled the delta of the Shatt-el-Arab of all Turkish or Arab enemies.
13. The timely advent of the 12th Brigade enabled General Barrett
to send a sufficient force to stem the Turkish offensive on the Karun
side, while the opportune arrival of the 30th Brigade on the battlefield
of Shaiba in the very nick of time at the crisis of the fight converted
a doubtful defensive engagement into a brilliant victory. Basra and
Muhammerah were saved and our oil interests secured. For more than
a year since then this region has enjoyed peace and prosperity. Our
strong position at Kurna had effectually stopped the Turkish advance
down the Tigris while our military occupation of the Karun Valley secured
the safety of the pipe line. Had the extra Division not been added and had
we contented ourselves with the passive defence of Basra, we should not have
had to our credit the prestige of the victories at and near Shaiba, while the
Turks would have been able to move by the Tigris line directly on Basra in
combination with flanking attacks both by the Euphrates and Shaiba line
and by the Karun Valley. The Bakhtiaris and Arabs would certainly have
wrecked the oil-fields and pipe line, and it is not too much to say that we
might have suffered an irreparable disaster.
14. Up to Kmna the India Office are able to produce proof for e
statement made and ample justification for every action taken, as the e
military policy of the campaign had so far been initiated, influenced
controlled by the instructions or suggestions of the Secretary of 5
but from Kurna onwards the initiative and the direction of events de
to the government of India, though of course the ultimate responsil