"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٣‎٩‎٨] (١٣٨٦/٨٠٥)

w*
<
V\
manding Capo squadron ]iave received any orders to assist, or even any
information that such an expedition is intended. If the expedition is to go,
and if it is to be run from England, and if our responsibility is to be limited
to finding the troops, &c. which you may ask for, I have no more to say, but
if responsibility for results is to rest on us then the entire preliminary
arrangements muse be left in our hands. Divided responsibility in this cast*
can only mean certain failure.
/Vb.cj,
Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 25th Avgust 1914.
Private. Your private telegram of yesterday. Force B. Colonial
Cilice cannot regard this as side-show, since they look to it, to avert possible
serious consequences in British East Africa and Nyasaland, even affecting
final settlement at close of war, though, ot course, main result will be decided
in Europe. As regards strength and composition of force we have to rely
largely on Colonial Cilice information, and also as regards railways' and
native transport, but selection of units was, of course, left to Commander-
in-Chief in India, and we understood that you also thought this a
specially suitable theatre far employment of Imperial Service Troops, of
which proportion^ to whole does not seem unduly large. Meanwhile
Expedition B has to remain in abeyance for the time because European
situation has made precedence for whole of Expedition A necessary, and
there is further advantage which you point out that definite junction of
Turkey with German" might possibly though not necessarily so affect
position in India as to oblige us to retain Force B and sacrifice gain in
blast Africa. I gather from Admiralty that escort accompanying B
will be amply sufficient to secure landing. As regards preliminary
arrangements and conduct of actual expedition, it seems imperative to follow
precedent of China expedition of 1900, when the force in all matters of
policy corresponded direct with this Office, and to let all responsibility
rest on His Majesty’s Government, since you have no means of working in'
concert with the Colonial Office or War Office, and of thus determining
scope of expedition and extent to which operations may be carried. I feel
sure that Commander-in-Chief will recognise that this is only possible way
of working this expedition.
ftb./o.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 26th August 1914.
Private. Force B. I accept your views as to responsibility of His
Majesty’s Government on the distinct understanding that Government of
India have no responsibility whatever for policy or execution of programme
beyond providing, as far as we are able, requirements of His Majesty’s
Government for proposed expedition.
I would point out that our opinion as to the suitability of German Fast
Africa as a theatre for employment of Imperial Service troops was never
invited, and we have simply met the requirements laid down in detail in
your telegram, No. 375, of Sth August. (Ttcu
JTojt . £>&/*>/'.)
Telegram f rom Secretary of State to Viceroy, No. 375,
dated Sth Avgust 1914.
The sending of a force to take and hold the ports is being considered.
If such a force is sent, it will be quite separate from that for any other
destination, and the latter is to be kept intact. Such a force will be managed
by India entirely, in a similar manner to the China Expedition.
Naval consideration will determine the date of despatch. The Admiralty,
India Office, War Office and Colonial Office are considering details. Most
likely the force required will be 1 squadron Imperial Service cavalry, 1 field
battery, 1 mountain battery, 1 company Imperial Service sappers, 4 battalions
Indian infantry, and 2 battalions Imperial Service infantry.
As 3rd Division should be kept intact the Indian infantry should be
found from 9th or 5th Divisions. /
MS 268 B