"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٣‎٧‎٧] (١٣٨٦/٧٦٣)

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Minute by tlie Military Secretary, India Office on the
Indian Military Administration.
Recent events in Mesopotamia and India, have made it apparent lh.,t
nnder the ])resent Military organization in India the Commander-in-Chie! is
so overburdened with administrative details and so tied to his desk that ir
is impossible i'or him to exercise the executive functions of his high oilice,
Mid it is obvious that his personal inlluence must suffer if he is out°of close
personal touch with the Army. Since the Army Commands have been in
abeyance the duties of discipline and training and ^inspection which were
placed in iheory on the two Army Commanders hav;$ devolved to a largty.
extent in practice on the Commander-in-Chief and therefore it is essentiaf
that the Commander-in-Chief should make himself personally acquainted
with the progress of the Army in training for war. To do this, absence
irom Army Headquarters will necessarily be frequent, and in his absence
smiio s)stem by which lus administrative duties can be supervised and
coordinated seems desirable.
The above criticism which is now generally recognised as a just one is not
directed against the Commander-in-Chief, but against the system which lie
has inherited. It will be in the recollection of the War Committee that in
'11)00 the old Military Department of the Government of India, together with
the Military Member of Council, was swept away, and replaced by an abortive
< >i gtinisut ion sty led the Military Supply Department. The immediate result
was not so disastrous as it might have been as there still existed three Army
Romiminds administered by Lieutenant-Generals with a complete Adminis
trative Stall' as well as the usual executive or combatant stall. So that
much of the detail work of tlie administrative services was still decentralised
and specifically allocated to the Commands.
Up to June 190/, Army Head-quarters, Simla, was thus practicallv
relieved of most details connected with supply, and also many of tlm
functions tliat now devolve on the Adjutant-General or the Quartermast'em
General. lor example, the Rom bay Command would have been responsible
for most of the business connected with despatch of troops from Bombay,
and the Principal Medical Officer of the Command would have been
personally responsible for the preparation of hospitals, for the reception of
sick and wounded at Bombay and elsewhere in that Command. Similarlv
in 1897, during the Tirali campaign, most of the supply and medical
arrangements were controlled by the Punjab Command, thus relieving the
Commander-in-Chief and Army Headquarters of much petty, though
burdensome, business. Further, under the old Command system there
was the great advantage of personal supervision. The Army Commander
would doubtless, in such a case as the present campaign, have frequently
gone to Bombay from his headquarters at Poona, to inspect hospitals
and troopships, to see troops depart, and to welcome the return of the
wounded. From his intimate knowledge of local conditions and of the
local stalls he would have been able to keep the Commander-in-Chief
personally informed of the state of affairs, while his personal relations
with the Governor and the Civil Staff:' of Bombay would have been invaluable
in securing the co-operation of the civil elements with the military. All
this personal touch is lost by the present one-man system. There is nothing
between the Brigadier at Bombay and the Quartermaster-General or
Adjutant-General, as the case may be, at Simla.
I might give many other instances but 1 really think it is hardly worth
while labouring the point.
Although a root and branch reorganisation of the Indian system is not
within the bounds of practical polities whilst we are stdl engaged in war,
the Secretary of State is of opinion that it is of vital importance to take
MS 254 3 31 ‘
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to