"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٦] (١٣٨٦/٤٧٧)

33
*
of Baghdad by British troops would imprest the Oriental mind not only in Turkey, but also
in Persia and India, and re-establish some of the prestige which we have lost by our tailur^
to torce the Dardanelles. ^ . , . ■ n ^
“If, however, ; we are unable to hold Baghdad when 60,000 fresh troops assemble h
i o-operate with Turkish troops at present in Mesopotamia, our withdrawal from Baghdad mig it
fiave as great and as unfortunate an effect on the Mohammedan world as our wit i iav\a 10 m
Pie Gallipoli Peninsula.”
From the above it will be seen that at this date the India Office and the
War Office were practically in agreement as to the risk involved.
Mr. Chamberlain also telegraphed privately on the subject observing that
it seemed “ imperative to stop Nixon’s further advance. . 1
On the 5th October the advance guard of General Townshend s ivision
had reached Aziziyah, nearly hall-way to Baghdad, and on that date tne
Secretary of State telegraphed as follows :—
“ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 5th October
“ Private. My private telegram of 4th instant. Nixon's advance. Cabinet, to whom
position was reported yesterday, decided to appoint Committee of General Staff, Admiralty
L-'oreign and India Offices to consider in all its aspects possibility and policy of advance on
Baghdad. Political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable as isolating Geimans
in Persia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place Barrow thinks we
mmht be ‘able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened by further losses would be
insufficient both to hold it securely against counter attack and to maintain comnninuat ons
Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Burope or Egypt- Bet me know youi
The above telegram was crossed, by one from General Nixon which
depicts the frame of mind produced on him by his recent notable \ictoiy .
“ From General Nixon, Kut-el-Amara, dated oth Oetobei 1915.
“ (Addressed to Chief of the General Staff; repeated to the Secretary of State for India,
1 with reference to his telegram of 4th October.)
“ 308/20'V ). Navigation difficulties have been overcome by lightening ships and utilising
Ihcm for towing laden barges and by marching troops with land transport. 1 he 1 )th Brigade
with all field artillery left this morning for Aziziyah by road, preceded hy l^dqu i eis
Cavalry Brigade with three guns, “ S ” Battery, and 100 lances. ( avalrv has orders to ieau.
* zizivah evening of the 7th.' Enemy appears to be no longer retreating, but has occupied
Otesiphon position and thereby constitutes a threat to us. Our information is that h,s troops,
eJffinally those locally recruited, have been much demoralised hy defeat at kut-el-Annu a a,
„ Isition which thev considered impregnable. They arc now so near Baghdad ta.it i u. -L'X- ■
ill have difficulty in making a determined stand with men who are close to their homes and
wish to desert. I consider, therefore, that there is every probability of catching and
i mashing the enemy at Ctesiphon as soon as the 6th Division has tally concentrated at
Aziffiyaluand Ins hoen reinforced by drafts of cavalry now on their way from Basraln It on
i he / t ber hand 5 we'retire from Aziziyah to Kut-el-Amara, the enemy and the whole of the
^ -m ;n thnir own construc tion on a such a move, and advance on Kut-el-Amara, as
^ » .-wvc-f o hrwm A ry> o i»o
On the 6th October in his II. 8215, the Viceroy quoted General X
views as,follows : —
“ With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action road to Baglid;
you kindly let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of ;
Division from France, in order that my position there maybe maintained. Effect
Occupying Baghdad would lie more than nullified if subsequent events should compel
course of time, to retreat down the river in consequence of reinforcements not
-forthcoming.”.
The Viceroy concurred in the above views in the billowing words :
ixon s
id, will
mother
of my
me. in
being
“In view of German activities in Persia, increasing pressure on A fghani-st m. ;
•aspect in the Balkans and Dardanelles, we hold that the capture of Baghd id would ha
•an effect in the Near East, and offers such, important political and strategi •»! a< v mtai
justify movement, but to do this at least an additional Division would he re jmred. Ot
we do not propose to allow him to go beyond Kut-el-A nmra.
and tli : ■
■ e rich
es as to
herw i so