"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٥‎٢] (١٣٨٦/١٠٣)

The telegram received the next day from Sir John Nixon regarding
various movements confirmed the suspicion that lie intended to push on.
The subject was considered by the Cabinet apparently on the 8th
October, for on that day the following telegrams passed between the
Secretary of State, the Viceroy, and General Nixon :—
“ From Seoi’etary of State to General Nixon, Basra, 8th October 1915.
“ (Repeated to India.)
“ d077. Very urgent. With what addition to your present force are you confident that
you can both occupy and hold Baghdad ? Reply direct and repeat reply to Government of
India.”
“ From General Nixon, 8th October 1915.
“ (Repeated to Chief of General Staff.)
” 308/218/0. Your 3077 of 8th. 1 am confident that I can beat Nur-ud-din and occupy
Baghdad without any addition to my present force. But if Turks should turn their serious
attention to the recovery of Baghdad and should send to Mesopotamia the large organised
forces which would be necessary for such an operation, then l consider that 1 should require
one Division (and I should like also one British Cavalry Regiment, in addition to my present
force to watch both the Tigris and Euphrates lines of communication and defeat the enemy
as he comes within reach. Further, the Baghdad position would be best from which to
do this.”
“ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8th October 1915.
“ Private and very urgent. Reference to my telegram of to-day to Nixon repeated to you.
Cabinet are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of
Baghdad that we shall make every effort to supply necessary force. We do not wish to
attempt it with insufficient forces. Are you satisfied that one division is sufficient."