"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [ظ‎‎٣‎١] (١٣٨٦/٦٢)

32
“ In my judgment it will not be wise to go to Baghdad unless we can increase the force by a
whole Division of Infantry and one or two Cavalry reyirnents, and this we know is impracticable
unless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
1 ‘ The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that we cannot under present circum
stances go to Baghdad without incurring unjustifiable risks, it must be remembered that
during the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia,
and consequently the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Aimenian army
at this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops.
" We do not know what may now be the strength of the Mesopotamian force, but we have
been told of a Brigade which was recently at Kifri and is now ictiring to Baghdad, and
presumably there is a Baghdad garrison apart from the force beaten at K ut-el-Amara, so
probably, not counting Arabs, the Turks can still muster some 10,000 men at or near
Baghdad. If we go to Baghdad and the enemy retires to Samarra, they may very possibly be
reinforced there by another 10,000 men or more from Armenia, and yet another reinforcement
from Aleppo , 1 * so 1 greatly doubt whether we can hold Baghdad for any length of time with
our present force.
“ We have practically no reserves to depend on and we must play a safe game and husband
our sorely strained military resources.
I have felt it my duty to place these considerations before the Secretary of State because
everything points to our hands being forced, unless we can arrest the present trend of events
by a prompt and imperative decision.
“ Kut-el-Amara is only about 120 miles by road from Baghdad, although by river it is 220
miles, and General Nixon's advance guard, in boats, has already covered some 20 miles of that
• listance. 1 see no indication of a halt in the pursuit, though in the present state of the river
I also see no probability of being able to overtake the enemy. If we do not stop him, General
Nixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and we shall then be faced by the grave
alternative of either having to withdraw again oi 1 of making our occupation effective. Hither
course involves serious considerations, more especially in view of the gloomy situation in the
near East.”
Un that same evening (the 4th October) the Secretary of State
telegraphed as follows to the Viceroy :—
“ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated 4th October 1915.
3071. 1 shall be glad to know what Nixon s present intentions are, as if, owing to
navigation tioubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy
there is no object in continuing the pursuit. J
“The orders conveyed in my 1812 of 24th April, and 3002 of 6 th August still hold good,
subject to course of events at Baghdad and elsewhere and to the recommendations you may
now make. J
1 lease cable tour estimate of enemy s present strength in Mesopotamia.
Ihe orders above referred to limited the operations to the Basra Vilavat
vide pp. 24 and 30, Part 111.
About the same time a Memorandum dated Gth October was prepared
by the General Staff, War Office, which though submitted a few days later
may conveniently be entered here :—
“Extracts from Memorandum by the General Staff, War Office.
“ It is probably quite feasible for Sir J. Nixon's force to advance to and seize Baghdad.
The question is whether he would be able to remain there.
“ For reasons stated in paragraph 4 below it appears quite possible for the Turks to
assemble a supenoi force, whose arrival would lead to active operations bv the \rabs
against our long and difficult line of communications.
“ It seems to us that to attempt to hold Baghdad, except with a force very much larger than
Sir .1. Nixon s. and with proportionately increased river transport, would be to courtdisaster
Even supposing that we were able to hold it in the face of any force the Turks could bring
against it, it is doubtful if we should be able to maintain our supply set vice during the months
when the Tigris is low.
" We have not been able to discover from maps or reports anv position in the neighbour
hood of Baghdad which would enable us to hold the town or district against a superior enemy.
Whatever line we took up would leave it open to the enemy to operate against our Hank and
line of communications.
3- see 110 reason why the lurks should not be able to concentrate a large force
against us if we are holding a position at Baghdad. In fact it seems easier for them Vo con
centrate against us there than it would be at Kut-el Amara, There are no doubt difficulties
m the way of transport and supply, but we think these could be overcome.
" 4 „ • ;, • • T)ie Turks knowing that our hands are full and that we are withdrawing
troops from Gallipoli to the Balkans, can reduce their forces in Syria—Palestine Hediaz and
ynlim -'Ti C T ■ P ' obabl f r ve 2 ?’°®S , ' M ">» ' v »y from Syria to -Ueso’potamia,
^ 0.1100 could easily be spared from the Gall,poll. The Russian inactivity in the Caucasus
makes it quite feasible for the Turks to spai-e 15,000 or 20,000 from that front esneci iHv il
the winter time. ’ ^ v 11
“ It therefore will become possible for 60.000 Turks to be assembled from the three districts
mentioned above, and to be conveyed in the course of some weeks to Baghdad. The occupation
l .Mr. Marling lias since reported in telegram Xo H7S, dated drh October ]<)15 rl,ar .Jamal P-
g ria h)r "ith 6,000 men from tlie Egyptian Kxpeditionarv Force.
tslia is said to be