"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [ظ‎‎٣‎٠] (١٣٨٦/٦٠)

30
“ e concur in Nixon's views and propose to authorise him to advance on Knt when he is
ready.
“So far as we are aware, Nixon knows nothing about the proposal to reinforce him
temporarily with the 23th Brigade, and has always believed his present force capable of
effecting the occupation of Kut so long as lie received drafts to till up his British battalions,
and he was not required to disseminate troops along the pipe line. We concur in his views.”
" Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Ai my Department, dated
6 th August 1916.
“ No. 8002. Your telegram No. H. 6798. J concur in course of action proposed by Nixon
and recommended by you unless you think fit to modify it in view of Marline’s telegram of
8 rd August and his surmise as to objective of Ispahan gathering Whatsis strength and
distribution of troops on Karun line P I presume that they are sufficient with local arrange
ments at Oil-fields for defence against raiders.”
The Viceroy in his telegram H. 7094, dated 18th August, replied
giving in detail General Nixon’s reasons for not increasing the strength
oi the force in the Karun Valley and ending as follows :—
“Nixon therefore concludes that the safeguarding of Oil-Fields under such conditions
would be beyond the powers of Force “ U ” without the withdrawal of so large a force of
troops from the Tigris as would jeopardise the situation on that river, and he desires it to be
made clear that with his present force he cannot render himself responsible for active
opeiations in 1 ersia so far inland as the Oil fields. In this opinion we concur. We do not
anticipate that the Bakhtiaris are likely to repudiate their agreement to protect the
on b ields, but we attach great importance to the early conclusion of an agreement by which
Bavi shall receive a subsidy either from the Oil Company or the Government for the pro
tection of lower pipe line from raiders. If this be done we do not see any undue risk in
Nixon s proposed advance to Kut-el-Amarah which strategically is desirable and will have a
quieting influence on Persia and the Bakhtiaris.”
The arguments seemed conclusive and the advance to Kut was finally
sanctioned. J
1 elegiam from Secretary of State to A iceroy, Army Department, dated
20th August 1915.
“ 3020. Your H. 7094 The penultimate sentence in my 3002 was with reference to local
disoideis and not to wider question of Persian or Bakhtiari hostilities. J therefore accept
Nixons military arrangements under existing circumstances. As regards political and
financial arrangements see my Foreign Secret telegram, dated 19th August.”
In September the forward movement was commenced. On the 14th the
headquarters of the 6th Division reached Sheikh Saad, and on the
loth Abu kummanah, six miles from the Ks-Sinn position which had been
very strongly fortified by the Turks. The next few days were occupied by
reconnaissances prior to the final advance which began on the 26th
September. By the 29th after severe fighting against strong opposition
the 4urks were m full flight and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-Amarah.
Durmg the action we captured more than 1,7< 0 prisoners and 13 guns
and inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel.
. , Tllis br j lliant victory concluded a definite phase of the campaign, as bv
it the complete occupation of the Basra Vilayat was secured. Kut-el-Amarah
had been specifically suggested by the Viceroy as the goal of our operations
(mde telegram H. 0o82, p. 28 ante), and it had been accepted as such by the
Secretary of State. That goal had been attained by the endurance and
valour of the 6th Division of the Indian Army.
'