الملف ٣٠١\١٩٢١ "بلاد الرافدين: تقارير استخباراتية" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٩] (٥٨٦/٢٢٨)

the army, some bringing the example of Syria to bear on the argument, others that of the Com
mittee of Union and Progress. The Naqib and those members of Council who are favourable
to his candidature to the throne of the ‘ Iraq fear that the recruiting officers may serve actively
or passively to advance the. cause of the Sharif. There is also a tendency to dwell on the com
fortable supposition that since H.M.G. has undertaken the organization of the Levies there is
no special reason for hastening the organization of the army.
The opposition to Nuri Pasha’s appointment was led by ‘Izzat Pasha; the debate at one
point degenerated into Personalities. Xuri Pasha is well known to be conducting an active
campaign on behalf of the candidature of one of the sons of the Sharif; ‘Izzat Pasha is by birth
a Turk and in sympathies certainly no pan-Arab. He looks with disfavour upon the ‘Iraqi
officers who served in Syria in the Sharifian Army; from the Turkish point of view they are
deserters who fought against their own government. This attitude has already been apparent
in the line he took on a sub-committee appointed by the Ministry of Defence to consider the
grading of officers in the Arab Army; ‘Izzat Pasha refused to admit the proposal that ex-
Sharifian officers who fought for Arab independence should receive one step in rank over ar-
Turkish officers {see No. 12, para. 8).
5. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the High Commissioner on May 26 addressed a
letter to the Council saying that he had heard that when Army proposals, and especially the
programme for enlistment, were discussed, some doubt was displayed In' the members
of the Council as to the attitude of H.M.G. with regard to the future National Army.
Though he failed to understand how any misapprehensions could exist after his previous letter
touching the transference of the Levy budget to the army, he pointed out that the British
Government regarded the making of speedy progress with the creation of the army as the most
important and urgent problem, in the interests of the ‘Iraq State, which lay before the Arab
Government, and he asked that army questions should be given precedence to all other business
in the Council.
6. At the same time the High Commissioner wrote privately to the Naqib saying that^he
was somewhat distressed to learn that, in connection with recent proposals for the creation of
the National Army, considerable hostility was displayed by the Council to the whole body of
officers who fought with the Allies and the Sharifian forces. . He went on to say that the British
Government regarded them in the light of allied troops fighting for the cause oi the allies
which was also that of Arab freedom; that the ‘Iraq State must necessarily depend on them in
great measure for the success of the National Army and that it would be a lasting blow to the
interests of ‘Iraq as an Arab State if these officers were converted by the short sighted dis-
couragement of a section of their countrymen into an element of (lisafi ection. He added that
it was essential that their services should be used to the utmost and that if there were any
'different sentiments abroad he would, regard them with the strongest disfavour.
7. The High Commissioner’s letter to the Council was read at the meeting of May 26th.
A Provisional Law for voluntary service in the ‘Iraq Army was laid before the Council by the
Minister of Defence and adopted unanimously.
PUBLIC OPINION.
8 The Adviser, Diyalah, reports that it is very noticeable what a large number of people
a,re keeping the fast this year who have never done so. before. The special instance which he
ntes does not however go to show that the phenomenon is due to an access of religious feeling
it is that of the Mayor of Ba‘qubah, who is under suspicion of tampering with the municipal
accounts and is therefore particularly anxious to conciliate the Mutasarnr.
In Baghdad it is a subject of general remark that the fast has gone out of, fashion.
9 There is good reason to believe that the petition addressed to the High Commissioner
from Mandali in favour of an ‘Iraqi Amir {see No. 12, para. 14; was arranged by the Qaimma-
qam at the instance of Saiyid Talib and that the Qaimmaqam forced people to > sign it under
threat of imprisonment. The same official reports that there is a distinct feeling m Mandali
in favour of Saiyid Talib and that it is rumoured a petition asking for his return ma> be
Fixpected. This may provide another opportunity for studying the Qaimmaqam s methods m
obtaining signatures to public documents.
10. Humours are current that the French intend to set up
Hamid as Amir in Syria.
11 .
a son of the Sultan ‘Abdul
3 iimir in oyim.
11 In Mosul the removal of Saiyid Talib has had a good effect in more than one way
U was much disliked owing to his previous history; moreover an impression has been created
iat the Government is not prepared to tolerate audacity such as his, but is ready m case of
f-'cessity to strike and to strike hard. The noisy elements have taken the lesson to heait.
w Nuri Pas ha Sa‘id sent one ‘Abdullah Effendi Faiyadh to Mosul with letters to the
otables in which he urged them to despatch letters to King Husain askingUum to send one of
is sons to the ‘Iraq. A considerable amount of excitement was aroused: Nun Pasha s action,
®W1 with newspaper reports of the Cairo Conference, w^re taken as indications that
aupled ^ ^i^tlfwlAas the tacit consent of the British authorities and, so perhaps their active
^umirt 11 Thi ldvfser reaffirmed to the Majlis ‘Idarah the fact that all expressions of opinion
ipport. . Oration. Though there is a large body of opinion m Mosul m
ill receive sy p . was judged that Nuri Pasha’s lettters were an untimely effort to force
tissue which should be properly decided by the Constituent Assembly and no messages have
6611 yj a 0 ng Moslems there are four parties in Mosul: (a) Out and out Nationalists who
dsh for comp 1 ete^evacuation or the reduction of our supervision to no more than a guarantee