"دليل بلاد فارس، المجلد I ويشمل محافظات أستراباد، شاهرود-بوستان، خراسان، وسيستان" [و‎‎٣‎٠‎٥] (٧٢٢/٦١٦)

they must make the best terms they can with Russia, having 1 no friend to
stand between them and their all-powerful neighbour. The most likely
consequence wiR be a sudden lit of alarm when we discover, some years
hence, that Persia has thrown herself into the arms of Russia ; and then
we may be hurried into a miserable war to compel Persia to be our friendly
aUy, like Afghanistan. It would be cheaper and more satisfactory to
begin by making a friend of Persia now. It may be objected that we
have guaranteed too much already; and that, if we take in Persia also, we
shall be guaranteeing the whole of southern Asia as far as India eastward.
Lut, surely, there are intermediate steps between the practical extinction of
our influence and the obligations of a guarantee. One very simple and
unobjectionable step would be the encouragement of a more lively interest
in Peisia and the Persians among the junior officers of our missions in
Busbahr and lihran. Perhaps the staff should be strengthened. At any
rate, the opportunity of exploring and surveying the country ought not
to be lost; for no one knows how long the chance may last. At present
no objection is made to a European's travelling anywhere, and asking
what questions he pleases. Every Englishman who travels in Persia does
some service to his country, by spreading the name and fame of England.
I do not mean by boastfulness; but by truthfully satisfying the curiositv
of the people. We pride ourselves on our capacity of dealing with inferior
races ; yet perhaps the Russians beat us there after all. Last year a Rus
sian officer brought one of the imperial orders of his country as a gift
from the Czar to the Zil-us-Sultan in Isfahan, and stayed there a fort
night, during which time he dined every day with some one of the local
grandees. Such association with the people enables one to understand them.
It might be possible to arrive at some more substantial basis of under
standing. Russia has the question of the delimitation of the Turkuman
frontier as a ground for debate for mutual concession—in short, as a
basis of new interests between herself and Persia. W^e might have a
similar ground in the navigation of the river Karun, for instance. There
is this objection, that if Persia refused to grant what we wished, we should
not be prepared to resort to force. But Russia can gain what she wishes
without resorting to force. Diplomatic contests between two powers of
Europe in an Asiatic court are an unedifying and unprofitable business.
But English and Russian interests in Persia are separated by the whole
breadth of the country, and there is much that we might do at present
without acting in any spirit of obtrusive rivalry. The north-eastern corner
of Persia is the part haunted by English travellers, and written and talked
about, so far as Parliament and the public pay any attention to Persia
at all. But our true line of action is along the seaboard and in central
Persia. Khurasan is practically out of our reach. We cannot afiect so
remote a region directly, either for good or evil. If we want to prevent
Khurasan and the rest of Persia from falling under the protection of
Russia, the most natural and obvious means is to build up a legitimate
influence of our own in those parts of the country with which we have
directly to do. Broadly speaking, the commerce of central and southern
Persia depends upon England and India. The Russian goods imported
in these regions are specialities of little value, such as samovars and
candlesticks. Can any one suppose that if Russia had such a trade with
Persia as we have, her political influence would not be vastly greater
even than it is ? The trade between India and Persia is capable of