"دليل بلاد فارس، المجلد I ويشمل محافظات أستراباد، شاهرود-بوستان، خراسان، وسيستان" [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎٢] (٧٢٢/٥١١)

458
It will be important, before we conclude this short account of the nature
of the government of Persia, and of the mode of administering justice and
collectino- the revenues in that kingdom, to offer a few general observations
upon the”power of the monarch and the practical effects of the whole system
of the internal administration of the country.
Nothing can be more difficult than to describe the operation of the sepa
rate parts,^or the whole, of a system of government, which is exposed, like
that of Persia, to continual and violent changes. But though these changes
produce a great effect, both on the character and condition of the nation,
they neither destroy nor materially alter those rules which are established
for the conduct of the administration, and which, guarded as they are by
usage, by public opinion, and by religion, are seldom infringed with impu
nity. The government of this country may be termed a military despotism,
the action of which is regulated by a consideration of the condition of its
subject and the situation of the empire. The power of the monarch of
Persia rests chiefly upon the fear he inspires. It has been well observed
that the arm of a despotic prince should be always uplifted. He must _ be
prompt to repel foreign attack, and to repress every appearance of sedition
or rebellion; for, surrounded by the ambitious and the turbulent, he can
enjoy no security, and his subjects can know no peace unless he be dreaded.
Powerful nobles and high officers of the empire are, from its frame, arbi
trary in their respective charges; and when these cease to tremble at the
supreme authority, the nation suffers a great increase of misery under a
multitude of tyrants.
The chief ministers of the court of Persia enjoy a very considerable,
though indh'ect, power, from being the medium of representation to a
sovereign who generally acts from the impulse of the moment, and whose
decisions must consequently be much regulated by the sentiments of those
in whom he reposes confidence. This kind of power, of doing good or evil
by secret or open communication with the king, belongs, in a greater or loss
degree, to all the officers of his government and the domestics of his house
hold ; and as the nature of absolute power makes it impossible that persons
so immediately attached to the monarch should be amenable to any inferior
tribunal, it follows that this class should be entirely subject to his will. It
is impossible, from the shape of the government, that the condition of this
class of persons should be otherwise than it is ; and no small proportion of
that security which the rest of the community enjoy may be referred to the
danger in which those near the king continually stand ; for, unless he be
very weak or very unjust, it is hazardous for any of his ministers or cour
tiers to commit violence or injustice in his name.
The governors and chiefs of tribes may be considered in nearly the same
relation to the king as his ministers ; and when we reflect on the facility
which the habits of the Persian monarch afford to his subjects of preferring
their complaints, and that policy which dictates attention to them, we must
be satisfied that, in a rude and half-civilised community, the exercise of
the absolute power of the sovereign over those to whom he delegates his
authority is essential to preserve the people at large from the oppression and
rapacity of petty rulers.
Though a great proportion of the kings of Persia may be deemed capri
cious, cruel, and unjust, we find very few examples in the history of that
country of their exercising their absolute prerogative, except over those
whom usage and the condition of the state they govern have placed at their