"دليل بلاد فارس، المجلد I ويشمل محافظات أستراباد، شاهرود-بوستان، خراسان، وسيستان" [و‎‎٢‎٥‎١] (٧٢٢/٥٠٨)

absence are earefnl to preserve the temper and attachment of their follow
ers. To this observation, however, there are frequent exceptions; and
tlmse petty rulers, when powerful, are often both cruel and oppressive. It
is not easy to describe with accuracy the rude system of judicature which
prevails in this class of the inhabitants of Persia. Common cases are
decided upon by the chief, or his deputy, in a manner similar to the lay-
magistrate of a city. When, however, a person of any consequence is
concerned, the proceeding is not so summary. A council or meeting of elders
is called, and the question is fully discussed and decided by a majority of
voices. Any man of family has the privilege to claim this trial; and it
would be deemed oppressive to refuse it. In a dispute between inferior
persons it cannot be demanded as a matter of right, but is often assembled
by the chief or his deputy, who desires popularity, as the tribe almost
invariably accord in the justice of a sentence passed by this tribunal.
The council above mentioned is not formed of any determinate number.
If it be to decide on any dispute relative to land, the principal landholders
form the council. If on a case of debt, the chief elders and the friends
both of the debtor and creditor meet to adjust it. When a murder is com
mitted, the relations of the deceased and those of the murderer are sum
moned before it; and if both belong to the tribe, they are admitted to
the assembly. The mulla of the tribe usually forms one of the council,
and expounds, when required, the holy law. This council has generally
for its object the accommodation of the dispute between the parties which
come before it, and it appears to have been constituted to preserve harmony
in the tribe; but when it cannot accommodate the difference, its authority
is given to support the law. Among the wandering tribes, as among
citizens, if a debtor refuse payment after the kazi has signed a decree
that the demands against him are just, he is either allowed a moderate
period to make his payments good, or all his property is seized and divided
in equal shares among his creditors. A murderer, when the crime is
proved, is given up to the heir of the deceased, to do what he chooses
with him—either to forgive, to take the price of blood, or to put
the criminal to death. It is almost always the object of the council
of elders to compound for murder, and they are more anxious to do this
when the parties are of different tribes ; for if pride or any other motive
prevent this settlement, and the offender is screened from justice, the
heir of the person murdered and his relations feel disgraced till they
can obtain revenge. In these cases, where the party has not force to
compel justice, assassination is applauded; though it almost always occa
sions more murders and interminable blood feuds. It is very usual for
the heir of a person who has been murdered to demand, not only goods
and horses, but one or more of the nearest relations of the murderer in
marriage; and this is deemed the best of all modes of ending the feud,
as it binds those in ties of kindred who were before the most inveterate
enemies.
The tribes of Persia have very different usages relative to forgiveness
of murder. Some have a pride in being considered implacable, and inva
riably exact life for life; but this is certainly not common. If a person
belonging to a tribe desire forgiveness for a murder that he has committed,
it is usual for him to hang a sword round his neck with a black cord, and
to go in that suppliant manner to their heir and declare, when he
approaches him, that he comes to receive his doom. Though the laws