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and operating, perhaps, as far as Aden, has already been considered. The effective
ness of such a patrol would, of course, depend largely on the facilities for obtaining
advance information rapidly from the coastal tribes within range, and being able
to use it.
(6) It would be useful, I think, if more frequent visits were paid along the
Southern Arabian coast, as far, perhaps, as Mokalla.
(7) It is not within my province or competence to discuss the existing equipment
of the sloops themselves, but it is important, also, apart from the question of localised
patrols, that the most suitable type of motor boat, as indicated by the experience of
the past few years, should be carried for examining the inlets where the sloop itself
cannot proceed.
(8) The idea of using armed dhows in the same way as ‘‘ mystery ships was
mooted in 1926. His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested then that, whilst
being less conspicuous, they might be more numerous and possibly better adapted for
keeping a close watch on the movements of other dhows. This suggestion was
rejected by the Admiralty, the reason given being that their employment off the
Somaliland coast to suppress arms traffic had proved a failure owing to the difficulty
of obtaining sufficiently fast craft and expert crews, and to the fact that their
identity became known to those engaged in the illicit traffic; moreover, it vyas found
that such service had a demoralising effect on the crews. If, as I believe, this
proposal contemplated manning dhows with a naval crew, I think, too, that an
attempt to employ them against slave dhows would not he more successful. The
manning of dhows with native crews, however—again with the large prize as a
bait—might, I think, give good results, particularly if these dhows worked in
conjunction with a local patrol.
(9) Every possible precaution should be taken to ensure that the sloops’
movements, intended calls at and departures from ports, should be kept secret {vide
in this connexion Admiralty letter to the Under-Secretary of State dated the
3rd July, 1924).
(10) The idea of coming to an agreement with the French and Italian
Governments with the object of throwing open the territorial waters reciprocally to
the patrols of all three Powers was considered in 1928 as part of a wider scheme for
co-operation in the suppression of the slave trade, a scheme which envisaged, among
other things, patrol by air. This project was dropped as a result of misgivings
entertained by His Majesty’s Ambassador in Paris, and so far as I know it has not
since been pursued.
In his despatch to the Foreign Office No. 279 of the 3rd December, 1928, His
Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested that one of the proposals made,
namely, that British and French territorial waters should be opened to the patrols of
both Powers, might be less open to objection than the others. He went on to say tffat,
on the assumption that there were no Admiralty objection to allowing specified
foreign vessels of war to enter British territorial waters for the particular purpose
in question, and for that only, he was inclined to think that an agreement to that
end between His Majesty’s Government and the French and Italian Governments
(for Italian waters would certainly have to be included) would be useful. He saw no
reason why, if negotiations were confined to this particular point without raising the
more difficult and contentious problems involved in air patrol, it should not be
possible of attainment. He therefore suggested that this matter might be taken up
with the French and Italian Governments. An all-round waiver of the sanctity of
territorial waters could, in the opinion of the British officers engaged on the patrol,
make the business of the slave dhows more difficult, even if it did not lead to actual
capture.
I should like to associate myself with that view. It is important that the
British sloops should be at liberty to inspect a dhow and examine her papers, if any,
whenever this appears expedient and whenever the dhow is found; it would also
greatly help matters, of course, if they could take further action against a suspicious
dhow, if only by towing her into the nearest port of her nationality to be further
dealt with there. If triangular agreement with the French and Italians proved
impracticable, perhaps it would be possible to come to an agreement with one or
other country separately.
(11) Failing any more definite agreement as suggested in the foregoing
paragraph it would be useful if, at least, the three Powers concerned came to an
informal understanding not to insist meticulously on the punctilious observance of
international rights, and if instructions were sent accordingly to local officers.