"ملف ٥/ ١٩٣ II (ب ٣٨) الرق في الخليج" [ظ‎‎١‎١] (٤٧٥/٢٧)

10
Proof of nationality is, however, difficult to obtain, ana dhows often carry „
of flags for use as occasion may suggest As the commander of . •
has reported, Arabian owned dhows seldom fly flags of any ■
the predominant colour, with white edges, crescent, daggeis or s ^ r
but a purple chequered loin-cloth will serve just as well. . , ,, .■.v i.:
46. It is clear that the Red Sea patrol labours under considerable difficulties^
On the other hand, it is not easy to see how matters can be improved to any
appreciable extent without incurring further expenditure expenditure of a
somewhat speculative nature, which might not easily be 1 ust '^ ed j
venture, however, to put forward the following suggestions, , hl J*L ; n v ; ew ■
involved it is not, I think, likely to be excessive, having regaro to the objects in view .
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The point is also worth considering I th | nk ’ m ‘°" "^L^.J’Xve.
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(1) In order to make it easier to establish the innocence or otherwise of a
suspect dhow, inspected or searched at sea, rigorous control and surveillance ot dhow
traffic should be exercised at the ports of departure on the Af ^ ca “
involve the enforcement by international agreement of regulations regardmg t e
possession of papers properly drawn up and recently endoise . women
special importance to the careful registration °f a ny c hddre } g
carried, and to the entry on the dhow’s papers of full particulars regarding all
PerS There are^no doubt, many ways in which a control of this sort couM be
circumvented. In many ways, admittedly, it would not be efiec n • , • '
however, that the present irregularities operate greatly in fav °"r of slave running
and that to penalise the absence of proper papers, or irregular ities in theni wo
o-o some wav towards improving matters. Any improvement here would be all to the
Sood I do not know whether there would be insurmountable difficulties m enforcing
such regulations on Arabian-owned dhows, but I imagine that pressure could be \
on them by administrative means when they enter African ports.
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question o^r the right of seach of Hejazi dhows, to which I have referred above
(2) It is most desirable, in connexion with the work ot the sloops, as also it
necessary in order to make any control of the West African pilgrimage effective that
steps should be taken to ensure that the Italian authorities in Eritrea sen,pulousl
carry out the undertakings given to prevent pilgrims crossing from Eritrea to the
Hejaz in^lhows^ommented on the extensive protection afforded to slave dhows by the
reef area north of Kamaran, which covers Medi. It seems to me that, in addi 10
to the regular patrol of the sloops, some form of localised patrol is required, and
would suggest that some small craft of shallow draught, perhaps one or, better two
boats in 'the nature or of the size of the motor launches used in the war might be
based at Kamaran for the purpose of cruising inside the reef area. 1 a m ass “ ml "f
that there would be no political objections to Kamaran being usec as a l ase in th,
way or, if so, that they could be overcome. It appears to me also that seaplane,
based on Kamaran, if this is feasible, could also play a useful part. The questiot
of having a local patrol based on Kamaran may be considered also in connexion witl
the fonowin^oSUggestioiii ^ elaborate for obtaining advance
intelligence of dhows’ movements may be impracticable for various reasons, I thin'
that something might be done towards this end by the employment of one or tw
agents There are^ of course, certain obvious difficulties about this. Irustworth)
and reiiable alents would be hard to find; also, if available, local agents would on,
be useful in places where ready means exist of communicating with British political
officers or with the patrol. If a local patrol were based at Kamaran it should not
I imagine be imjISsible to establish contact with Medi and obtain advanc
information from there. An essential condition for the success of this or, for thai
matter of any such scheme involving obtaining intelligence from natives would M
the payment of large prizes for information leading to a conviction.
I have not explored the possibility of obtaining reliable local information troii
other ports ports, that is, which are m communication with Jedda It would l
imagine be largely a question of expense. It might not be impossible, but. on th
other hand, I consider that there are strong political objections in attempting to d
so which would outweigh the problematical advantage to be gained.
(5) I presume that the question of having a localised patrol based on leiim
similar to that suggested above, limited to patrolling the Straits of Bab-el-Mandel
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