ملف ١٩٢٢/٥٢٢، جزء ٧ "البحرين: المطالبة الفارسية بالسيادة عليها؛ مفاوضات المعاهدة الفارسية ١٩٢٩-١٩٣٠" [و‎‎٣‎١‎٢] (١١٢٦/٦٢٨)

the estaDlishment of security in the Gulf 51 *
It is easily understood that up to the year 1869
the British Government never spoke of having any right over
Bahrein or of Bahrein "being independent. Another passage
of the said note tends to prove more explicitly the {suprem
acy of Persia over Bahrein, namely : ”If the Persian
Grovemment is prepared to maintain sufficient forces in the
Gulf so as to ensure the above objects (already explained
in the foregoing lines), this country will be spared a
troublesome and expensive task. But if the Shah is not
prepared to take upon himself the discharge of these duties,
Her Majesty 1 s Government cannot conceivably imagine that
the Imperial Government wish to encourage outrages and
disorder in those waters by lack of necessary punishment T! .
This passage proves that if the Imperial Government shows
its readiness to take up the duty of maintaining a pOo-ice
force in the Gulf, the British Government will he spared
a vexatious and expensive task ^ich has inouced them to
interfere with the affairs of Bahrein, Lord Clarendon
further proceeds in that same note as follows .
»I haV e the honour to state that Her Majesty’s Govern
mentjWill previously inform the Imperial Government of any
action which at any moment may be necessary for subduing
the Sheikh, should his behaviour necessitate such action-.
This passage shows that the British Government considered
it its own duty to inform the real owner of the islands
of the circumstances when necessary, a duoy which would
obviously be unnecessary if the British Government harbour
ed any hesitation as to Persia’s sovereignty over Bahrein.
Over and above all that has been said in these artiels j
there