"السكك الحديدية وسياسة [خطوط الاتصالات]، بلاد الرافدين. المجلد III" [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٣] (٥٤٩/٤٠٦)

1 1
From C. in C,, India,
To :- War Office•
SECRET
Despatched 12.10 a.m. 1.10.18.
Received 10.25 p.m. 2.10.18.
78587 Q»13. September 30th.
Operations.
/
Paragraph 1. Telegram X*2507 September 26th from Force D.
indicates 50 miles 50 lb rails now in hand in Mesopotamia instead
of being devoted to Persian extension are about to be used for
Euphrates line. Marshall moreover Is apparently ear-marking
rolling stock for Euphrates line in preference to Persian. In
consequence of this double programme urgent demand for further
supplies of rails and rolling stock are made by him.
2c As you are aware I have always had serious doubts as to
military necessity of conpleting the Euphrates line. The present
Tigris L> of C„ is not only ample fur Marshall's existing force
including that in Persia but possesses a margin of considerable
surplus capacity. The Euphrates line project originated from
Freeland's report which was based on the hypothesis of the mainten
ance of 11 divisions, Allenby r s victory in Palestine has now so
materially altered the military situation as to permit of a
reduction to an 8 division standard which in my opinion will be ample
to cover < 3 /cry reasonable forecast of Mesopotamia 1 s future
liabilities, including that of the Caspian
3c The only grounds left for constructing a new Lc of Co therefore,
are the development of local resources on the Euphrates and a
possible reduction in the total personnel employed an transporta
tion services.. Former should be mot by light feeder lines from
Hillah and development of river transport on Euphrates which will
bo practicable on completion of canal now being dredged through
Hamer Lake. As to hoped for reduction in personnel I have gravo
doubts of its being realized for a considerable periodo
4. As regards rolling stock, the provision of arranged stock
referred to in Marshall's telegram 0728June 22nd would on
present Tigris railway system cover the increase of number of
trains per day from 8 to 14 and allow for 4 trans on Baghdad-
Khanikin section. Former is now unnecessary, having in view
considerations stated in paragraph 2 above. Thus the portion of
stock under order originally intended for the Tigris provided
Euphrates project was dropped could be made available for allotment
to the extension beyond Khanikin,
5. It is true the Euphrates line would ensure some administrative
advantages in point of quickness of transit but against this must
be set the following ?-
(a) urgent need for economising in railway material, especially
in view of India 1 s present needs set forth in previous telegrams to
you and India Office. lb) Difficulties of freight. (c) Cost in
money material and labour of equipping a new L. of Cc with accommo
dation for troops hospitals supply depots etc.
6 * Marshall 1 s proposal to divide between the Euphrates line and
the Persian extension the rails and rolling stock now available or
under orders overlooks or misapprehends the decision stated in
paragraph 4 of your telegram 65249 D.M.O. August 28th that the
Persian extension Is to bo given priority,
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