"السياسة إلخ تبعًا لتوصيات الفريق أول سموتس: مصر وبلاد الرافدين" [و‎‎١‎٨] (٤٨/٣٥)

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s E C R E T.l
^PERATI OKS
LEAR THE LINE.
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t7/ 5
Fran:- 0. in C., India.
To:- C.I.G.S.
,
Handed in■- 10,45 p.m,)
Received:- 10.40 p.m. ) ^ 3 ' / ‘' //lG •
14f;5S 23rd. Your 52731 cipher February 2 l3 t.
1. The adoption of recommendations made by General Smuts is
connected closely with our Persian policy as you know that the
Government of India have always advocated conciliation recent
events and particularly the Dunstervilie Mission may require
resort to force with result of reducin S the possibilities of
transfer of strenr-th from Mesopotamia to Egj^pt. Should
conciliation be given a fair trial now there still seems reason
to hope that it may be successful at any rate to an extent
sufficient to enable us to continue to rely entirely on the
moral effect on the Persians of our troop, on the T i Gri ,.
2- Cur offensive in Palestine win depend for results on
continued opposition in force by Turks but should the enemy
prefer to fall bad, before us trusting to our striking force
being reduced by the lengthening of our lines oc " <
... J -tinea of communication the
ic not clear to me that any objective short of Aleppo win
ensure that the enemy does not refuse our attack i„ Syria in
order to attack Bagdad.
!' ° Ur HeS ° POtamia SiUlatiWl meetly reacts on our length in
mdia where reserve British battalions add considerably to our
number of British troops and enable no +-,
P anc enable us to maintain in this country
a proper proportion of Bri tl-'n - j -
1 t0 Indian soldiers.
Moreover in the event of serious trouble here requiring
immediate reinforcements transfer from Mesopotamia to Indian
always available.,
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