"السياسة - بلاد الرافدين" [و‎‎١‎٢] (٣٦/٢٣)

32*f.3(
SECRET,
OPERATIONS.
Clear the line.
2M-'7
From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.
To:- C.in C., India.
repeated C.I.G.S.
X 3750 Sept. 21st 11.20 p.m.
With reference to C,M.A. f s T.L. 333 Sept. 19th which raises
the question as to whether in event of Prjevalski’s suggestion
being accepted we should not withdraw our undertaking to
maintain Baratoff’s column on Dialha River. My efforts have been
consistently directed to encourage Russians to take offensive
even though it should be limited because in my opinion purely
defensive attitude on their part would give enemy opportunity
of leaving small containing forces strongly entrenched opposite
them and detaching bulk of his troops to operate against Baghdad..
Moreover offensive is desirable from point of view of restoring
Russian troops to fighting efficiency alone as it is common
knowledge that troops whose morale is low usually continue to
deteriorate so long as they are inactive. But it seems clear now
that smooth undertakings of Russian Commanders are not to be relied
upon. As you will remember distinct promise of vigorous offensive
which never materialised was given by Russian Commander in Chief
in Caucasus last Spring when we entered Baghdad. This promise
has recently been renewed and time of commencement was
fixed for varying dates in September and October. Now at eleventh
hour it is proposed to withhold all co-operation except such as
will benefit Arabs. I have not ceased to explain to Prjevalski
that provided Baratoff moves early enough he should be able to
regain