"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٥] (٢٥٦/٢٥٢)

51
No.^Wr-
(jfnernl \i.ron to Seci ttary of Staff for India, dated 28th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Tigris line: General Townshencl withdrew his force unmolested during night of 27th 28th
November to Aziziyah. Air service repoi’fs nioi-ning of 28th that large camps being at
Ctesiphon. One division infantry with one cavalry and one artillery brigade reported moving
on Lajj. Another column reported to be moving north and east of Lajj. General Townshend
does not anticipate that enemy will advance beyond Zeux*. Should they do so, he will retii’e
on Kut to covei* concentx*ation of reinforcement. Reports indicate possibility of hostile force
from Jassan moving to Sheikh Saad.
No.^
df)ioral Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 29th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
General lownshend is still at Aziziyah, 29th November, unmolested. He pi’oposes to
withdraw to Shadi and cover concentration at Rut. Small mixed reconnaissance force
formerly at Bedrai has tempoxarily interrupted my communications near Sheikh Saad.
General Headquarters remaining at Rut.
I iceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th November 1915.
( Telegraphic.)
Reference your telegi'am of 25th instant. Independent examination prior to i-eceipt of
Nixon’s telegram <>f 26th November, leads us to agree generally with estimate of TuiTish
strength at C'tesiphon and Bagdad and its i ate of growth, except that we prefer to work on
the figures 60,000 by end of January, as estimated by combined War Office and Admiralty
staffs in October. Nixon is correct in his view that ruling factor in rapidity of our
concentration is the supply ol additional river transport, in which respect you have received
repeated requests from us to hasten rate of supplies, and we are searching India for suitable
vessels. In the meantime Nixon must do the best he can with what he has got, which
on a rise of the river and by mai-ching troops from Amara should enable him to get the
Lahore and Meerut Divisions to Rut-el-Amara early in February. As x’egards his force,
Nixon is in error in counting upon 34th and 35th Brigades which are to bo withdrawn when
replaced by Lahore and Meerut Divisions as their presence in India is necessary. It follows
that Nixon s force mav have to be increased from elsevvhei’e, and in our opinion a safe estimate
for the capture and retention of Bagdad under altered conditions involves addition of at least
one more division which with the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and drafts will make Nixon's
foive to five divisions in all. This estimate of five divisions which w r e consider a safe one is,
however, based on the following facts:—(1) That since 19th October, when the joint
Admii*alty and War Office Stall drew up their estimate, nothing has occurred or is likelv
to occur in the near Last to prevent Turks sending the full amount of reinforcement then
considered possible : (2) That Russia remains inactive in the Caucasus and north-west Persia.
If on the other hand it should be thought that any important modifications in above factors
have taken place or are likely to do so we consider Nixon will be able to capture and hold
Bagdad with four divisions and that if will not be necessary to draw' an additional division
fi om the main theatre unless it were freely available owing to the genei*al strategic plan of
opeiations. lo regard capture of Bagdad as impossible would be to give up our best means
uf countering the German intrigues in Persia and Von Der Goltz s plans
against India and should thex-efore be dismissed from our calculations. Our
success hitherto in Mesopotamia lias been main factor which has kept/Persia. Afgfmmsran,
•and India itself quiet, and to give up the idea of Baghdad would be to relinquish initiative
and would result in a further transference eastward of the theatre of war. For these reasons
we approve Nixon s attitude in not discussing the alternative of adopting a defensive attitude
as a permanency though he must necessarily remain chiefly on the defensive until hi
re inf ox-cements can reach the front.
Sir John Ni.ron to Secretary of State far India, dated 30th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
30th. General Townshend is slowly withdrawing on Rut. Column under Mellis left
Aziziyah, 30th November, to reopen communications at Sheikh Saad. Enemy’s advanced
guard, strength 3,000. reported at Elkutunie, main body at Zexir, 30th November.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 30th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference Nixon s telegram of 29th November. Is he preparing strong defensive position
at Rut ? Does he still px-oposo to x-etain troops at Nasirivah V
S 30f> j[