"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٢] (٢٥٦/٢٤٦)

15
of liiigiliul-Saimu ra i-ailway in that if would pi'event any possibility of surprise attack on us.
He considers that all our interests lie in our holding Bagdad, hut recognises that without
addition our present forces might be driven out of jt, and that this might involve a very
difficult and dangerous retreat down the river. Shortly, he is opposed to a raid on Bagdad
followed by a withdrawal. He is strongly in favour of holding Bagdad if reinforcements
are forthcoming. If they are not forthcoming, lie prefers safety of Kut-el-Amara position.
He feels, however, that present military situation is such that it may at any time become
necessary to occupy Bagdad even with our existing forces, and accept the risk involved.
My own comment upon the Commander-in-Chief's view is that from a political point of
view it would be disastrous to be driven out of Bagdad.
(d) Remain in a defensive position at Kut-el-Amara. This is a course that does not
appeal to ns. for it shows weakness which will be recognised both by Turks and the tribes,
and may force our hands into advancing after all.
Having placed these alternatives before you I leave the question with confidence for His
.Majesty s Government to decide, but I trust that tin* decision will be in favour of the first
alternative.
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Secretary of State for halia to 1 'teeroy, dated 2 1 .ft October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of 21st October. Baghdad advance. Report of combined
Staffs estimates that Nixon has only some 9,000 Turkish troops and some irregulars to deal
with for next two months ; that Turkish forces may be somewhat increased by end of year,
and they might conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by end of January and even larger figures
during 1916. They consider that if reinforced by two Indian divisions from France he might
with assistance of river flotilla face risk of attack by 60,000, but there would remain possibility
of enemy receiving further reinforcements at later date. Staffs hold, therefore, that it would
be unwise from purely military point of view to occupy Bagdad unless military authorities
have power to withdraw troops at once without regard to political considerations if military
exigencies make this necessary. The War Office would give the two Indian divisions, but
could not under any circumstances spare further reinforcements, and are doubtful of their
capacity even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think
Bagdad can be taken easily and held for some time, but as explained above it might become
untenable later. At present moment it seems that German attempt to break through to
Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain.
Persia seems drifting into war on German side whilst Arabs are wavering, and unless we can
offer them great inducement will probably join Turks. We are, therefore, in great need of
striking success in the East both to check Persian movement and to win Arabs. <4*-A*
nuM-tfb-J nl l.hiiti. .oerntpy - BiM^ihtd «jr>yp**f H«wnrwTir«p« tm. Ar»»h UaUat'ii tliW
«wnoi>it4on nf Twrk*. Ui ywepumud
"dhpiiMli Bagibind in coui**eG<m-->4^ww+*kv—Unless you consider
that possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations
seem to ns to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.
No. ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية
II ar Office to ('oimuauder-in-CMef, India, dated 22nd October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
An appreciation of intelligence in the Near East is as follows :—The Germans appear to
be likely to succeed in their attempt to get through to Constantinople, their object being to
supply munitions to enable the Turkish Army to drive us out ot Gallipoli rather than
to disseminate their own forces by tying up troops in the Balkans. Some 200,000 Turks
would thus be freed and rendered available for operations against us either in Egypt
or in Mesopotamia or in both. 'Flu our threats on Constantinople from the Dardanelles cease,
the consequent Turkish movement on /Mesopotamia could only be stopped at Alexandretta
and the occupation of Aleppo, requiring a considerable force, would be entailed by operations
ther
/
la 3
No.-SiW
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2ord October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of the 2lst instant. Bagdad advance. Your description
of the situation in the Near East proves conclusively the necessity for action in the Middle
East mto prevent if possible Persia and Afghanistan declaring against us. We accept
the calculation of the combined staffs of possible strength of Turks that may with time be
brought against us, but with reinforcement of two Indian divisions from France we believe
that Sir J. Nixon has a reasonable prospect of being able to hold his*own against 60,000 or
70,000 Turks, pro\ ided that he occupies Bagdad as soon as he is ready. Although I realise
that the occupation of Bagdad is a provocation that will probably determine the Turks to
send large forces to attack us. which, however, will not be easy for them to do, and although
the bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored, 1 am confident that
the right policy at the present time is to take the risk and to occupy Bagdad with the least
possible delay, relying upon you to send the two divisions from France as quickly as possible
to Mesopotamia. On this understanding I propose, unless 1 hear from you before Monday to
the contrary, to order Nixon to march on Bagdad at once.
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