"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎١‎١‎٧] (٢٥٦/٢٣٦)

/
30
4 ^Political reasons were thought to make occu])ation^lesii , al)le as isolating Germans
in Persia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place. Kmattm tliinlrn w«r
.iiligkt be able to capture llagila^i, but that -force* weakened b_v I'urtbec .k>«*es-aoald lie
insufficient lw>tii to hohl it seenrelv Htrainsl counter attack anti to maintain eoitiimtitieHtionM
Kitckener cati bold out no hope of reinforcements from linrope or Kgvpt. Ta't me know your
A
No. >84
deneral A i.mv to Secretary of State for India, dateil nth October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Navigation difficulties have been overcome by lightening ships and utilising them for
towing laden barges and by marching troops with land transport. The 16th Brigade
with till Held artillery left this morning for Aziziyah by road, preceded by headquarters
Cavalry Brigade with three guns, “ 8 ” Battery, and 100 lances. Cavalry has orders to reach
A/.iziyah evening of the 7th. Enemy appears to be no longer retreating, but has occupied
Ctesiphon position and thereby constitutes a threat to us. Our information is that his troops,
especially those locally recruited, have been much demoralised by defeat at Kut-el-Amara, a
position which they considered impregnable. They are now so near Bagdad that Nur-ed-din
will have difficulty in making a determined stand with men who are close to their homes and
wish to desert. I consider, therefore, that there is every probability of catching and
smashing the enemy at Ctesiphon as soon as the 6th Division has fully concentrated at
Aziziyah, and has been reinforced by drafts of cavalry now on their way from Basra. If on
the other hand we retire from Aziziyah to Kut-el-Ainara, the enemy and the whole of Hie
tribes will place their own construction on a such a move, and advance on Kut el-Aniara. as
he did on Amara in July last, when troops were withdrawn from post above Annu a in order
to reinforce General Gorringe on Nasiriyeli line. Then a powerful section of the tribes who
had already submitted to us rejoined the Turks, and has been a continual source of trouble
until British prestige was re-established by the victory at Kut-el-Amara. The Arab tribes now
regard us as irresistible, and have been coining in from all directions to make submission : but
if we withdraw will probably behave as before.
It is my view that we have in front of us a shaken enemy who has lost 16 guns and is
deficient of ammunition, and for military reasons it is clearly desirable to smash him while we
can. He has taken refuge in a position where we can manoeuvre and I hope destroy him. 1
see nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity. From a military point of view
Bagdad is a focus of Turkish lines of advance and a large supply centre, of which in our
interests it is vital to deprive the enemy, and this quite apart from any political effect its
occupation might have.
No. W
I iceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference your telegram of 4th October. Nixon's intentions were as staled in his
telegrams of 3rd and 5th October which were repeated to you. He has also telegraphed to
India as follows :—
‘ ; With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action road to Bagdad,
will you kindly let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another
division from France in order that my position there may be maintained. Effect of my
occupying Bagdad would be more than nullified if subsequent events should compel me in
course of time to retreat down the river in consequence of reinforcements not being forth
coming. Regarding operations in Van district, should like information thereof. Have
Russians progressed sufficiently far to threaten upper Tigris route from Asia Minor r
In these views we concur, and suggest that, as the Indian troops are reported to have
participated with credit in the recent fighting, the present moment, if there should be any
intention of moving Indian troops from France befo re th e winter sets in, would be op port une
for doing so. In view of German activities in PorshtfiiH i nui ini>-pi‘i'i ini)'c on TUyh;uii*iamja.iid
the aspect in the Balkans and Dardanelles, we hold That the capture of Bagdad wouffTiiave
such an effect in the Near East and offers such important political and strategical advantages
as to justify movement, but to do this at least an additional division would he required.
Otherwise we do not propose to allow him to go beyond Knt-el-Amara. Nixon lias been given
Russian position south of Van as reported by Marsh. Our estimate of present strength of
.enemy in Mesopotamia is 8,500 rifles, 600 sabres, and 28 guns under command of Nm- ud-din.
Of the above 7 battalions, amounting to approximately 3,500 rifles with 8 guns, are at or near
Suliman Pak, and have not been engaged against us. They include 4 battalions and 4 guns
recently arrived from Mosul. Force under Hussain Raouf Bey, which was near Kasr-i-Shirin,
may also shortly be at Suliman Pak. Remainder of enemy's force, numbering some 4,000
infantry, 500 camelry, and 6 squadrons of cavalry with 21 gains, constitutes the remnants of
the troops defeated by us at Ku.t-el-Amara, and is retreating up the Tigris towards Suliman
Pak, where indications seem to show that it may make a fresh stand.
No.^i
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. *¥«ur private telegram of 4th instant. Nixon's plans. Please sec* telegram
of to-day. Orders were telegraphed yesterday to Nixon to stop further advance. Hr sent
situation is as follows : Nixon with forces at his disposal could without much diffieultv
capture Bagdad, and at the same time take or destroy Turkish steamers and other boats,
thus practically preventing any further attacks down stream. But lie could not remain there
exposed to attack by Turkish reinforcements from Mosul or Aleppo without himself being
reinforced by one division of troops. It would bo a grave political error to advance to
Bagdad, and to retire later under pressure from the Turks. Consequently, unless it be
/A-iSi
I'll
\
l‘*b