"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٢٥٦/٢١٣)

ana 11 seems narai^ iiKwxy biiab jbucii a
isolation or show skch active jjfostility to Persia as to advance
to Karun River themselves. JThey are more likely te*'©ef?tent.
themselves by inciting BenyLsm and Sheikh of Mohammerah’s
disaffected tribesmen ^-o threaten Ahwaz. As regards Jehad
movement Sheikh of Mohaperah is still anxious about its effect,
but as regards Ahwaz withdrawal of Europeans and British subjects
has deprived fanaticjf of \heir main objective, and it is hoped
that loyal tribesm^ff of hi\ own clan whom the Sheikh has sent up
from Mohammerah widl sufficfe to prevent any serious raid on Ahwaz
pending arrival /f 12th Brigkde. There seems to be no reason at
present to anticipate spread \»f Jehad movement to oilfields, and
it would be a/ainst the interests of Bakhtiari Khans and tribesmen
to be drawn into it or allow arV invasion of fields. The mere
cutting of Jpipe line would not b^e a very serious matter.
I entirely agree with the vttew that Force B should be increased
to two d^isions. In that case we could advance to Nasiriyeh
and Amara, should the military authorities consider this desirable.
Cox maintains that Basrah will not settle down until this advance
is rn^ie. When I have seen Barrett I will telegraph further
on this point.
As