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"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٩‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٩٢)

هذه المادة جزء من

محتويات السجل: ملف واحد (١٢٦ ورقة). يعود تاريخه إلى ١٩١٤-١٩١٦. اللغة أو اللغات المستخدمة: الإنجليزية. النسخة الأصلية محفوظة في المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وثائق جُمعت بصفة شخصية. وسجلات من مكتب الهند إدارة الحكومة البريطانية التي كانت الحكومة في الهند ترفع إليها تقاريرها بين عامي ١٨٥٨ و١٩٤٧، حيث خلِفت مجلس إدارة شركة الهند الشرقية. .

نسخ

النسخ مستحدث آليًا ومن المرجّح أن يحتوي على أخطاء.

عرض تخطيط الصفحة

Germany, whose aim is to create a situation in which it will appear that Turkey is the object
of aggression of one or more Christian Powers. Violations of neutrality, as in ease of Goeben,
are too technical to he understood by the Muhammadan masses, but the presence of belligerent
ships and the disembarkation of troops in Turkish waters are facts of which the provocative
character are apparent to all. Thot. »u«h pi‘MTWn4iwff ehorrld be giren bj ludwm nhipe eg
Utiops will m. bed effect in India, and Afghanistan and mu at-A*) to play into tlie hands
of Germany. 1 agree with Sir 1<. Mallet- thai at- present moment, presence of three of onr.
Shfttfe ol A nab is not deiumdbiu from an intmaiatiownl point- *4 view-, but_to send
troops into these neutral waters would probably he met by tiring on onr-abipH from the Fort
at Kao. Materially this would do us no harm, but if we took no action our prestige in the
Gall wnwld'viminh. -w4tde - if-we rrfttbated - we--«dTrmM jihrcr 1 " rmrwelrerecnGroly- in the wnmg.
Disembarkation at Abadan presents no difficulty from a military point of view, but to do
so will be to walk deliberately into a trap not unskilfully laid for us. Before any final
decision to disembark troops at Abadan is taken, 1 trust His Majesty’s Government will
consider verv carefully the above aspect <4 the question and particularly effect which it is
likely to have upon the attitude of Muhammadans in India, which is at present very satis
factory in every way. It is quite clear notliing can really secure safety of oil works except
the occupation of Abadan, but we see no reason to anticipate an attack upon them and we
doubt their value being so great as to outweigh consequences of an apparent attack by us on
Turkey. Again, the occupation of Abadan by a large military force would almost certainly
evoke a protest by Persia, and in the event of hostilities with Turkey would constitute a
violation of neutralitv of Persia, and would afford a pretext to Turkey for the extension of the
frontier at the expense of Persia. If, on the other hand, object in view is merely to
demonstrate at the head of the Gulf, other alternatives present themselves.
To land troops at Hassidu would be known immediately all over the Gulf, and would
create an immense impression. To this there could be no possible political objection, but from
a military point of view the di fficulties of water supply on the island are almost insuperable.
After Bassidu. Bahrein is politically 4hw Hrftinlt towitony in the Gnlf,
and there seems to be no serious objections to this alternative. -T-b»v omt
-Mfely to be obst ruel.i ve. if the situation were explained to him. There is also an advaiiieyo
in favour of Bahrein in the fact- of our having a force there would strengthen our hand> end
objection to Bahrein is difficulty of embarking and disembarking troops, owing to shallowness
of the water, but this could he mitigated by plentiful supply of boats. 1 propose to send
Sir P. Cox as political officer with am expedition to the Gulf, since his knowledge of the
Chiefs and of Gulf politics is unique.
Sir Ij. Mallet to Sir Ktla'iird, Urey, dated 6th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Military attache had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he
derived the impression that his Fxcelleney had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in
Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the future, and possibly measures are now being
taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with
Germany; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During
the conversation. Minister of War disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of
initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary
Syrian garrison bad not been reinforced. He said that, as in the case of other troops within
the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary
transport animals, Ac., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the
officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said,
depended on the political situation, for which be was not responsible individually, and it was
quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even,
perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking-
enterprises against the Suez Canal oi elsewhere, but he admitted that proposals had certainly
been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all
eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and
he added that no troops, but only gendarmes, bad been moved in the direction of Gaza.
Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary
against Great Britain, and in justificatioii of this, he pointed to the entrance of British
men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, ami to the
presence of tlx- British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military
attache said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of His Majesty s Government were
concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by Turks, and Great Britain certainly
had not the slightest intention of making any attack upon Turkey. It was quite ridiculous
to suppose that tin- arrival of Indian troops in Egypt bad anything to do with hostility to
Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained
her neutrality ; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish
control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attache said that Turks could
not be surprised that Great Britain should be preoccupied if Turkish troops were assembled
further south than Jerusalem or Beerslveba on the one side, or Maan on the other.
No,X
Sir L. Mallet to Sir tuiward Urey, dated 6th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
His Majesty s consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows:-
\ ali says that he must obey the orders which be has received. He has communicated a
copy of these to me. They are to the effect that the whole of the Shatt-el-Arab and sea
A 2

حول هذه المادة

المحتوى

يحتوي الملف على نسخ من مطبوعات رسمية مطلوبة للجنة القانونية الخاصة بحملة بلاد الرافدين [لجنة بلاد الرافدين، ١٩١٦-١٩١٧]. تتضمن الأوراق نسخًا من برقيات ورسائل (أُعيد صياغة بعضها) من وزير الدولة لشؤون الهند ونائب الملك وقائد قوة المشاة للسنتين ١٩١٥-١٩١٦، الفريق أول السير جون إكلز نيكسون. ينطوي الملف على أوراق متعلقة بالعمليات في السنتين ١٩١٤-١٩١٥، الترتيبات الطبية للحملة (الأوراق ٣٣-٦٠)، مزاعم صحفية بشأن التقدم من كوت العمارة في ١٩١٦ (الأوراق ٩١-٩٣)، ومسألة احتلال بغداد (الأوراق ٣١-٣٢).

وُضعت الأوراق ضمن ملف مذيل في الغلاف الأمامي بالنص: "الإدارة العسكرية. "أوراق سابقة" وموسوم بالرقم "٣". طُبع على ملصق آخر في الغلاف الأمامي النص التالي: "لجنة بلاد الرافدين، ٢٨ شارع أبنجدون، وستمنستر."

الشكل والحيّز
ملف واحد (١٢٦ ورقة)
الخصائص المادية

ترقيم الأوراق: يبدأ تسلسل ترقيم الأوراق (المستخدم للأغراض المرجعية) داخل الغلاف الأمامي بالرقم ١، وينتهي على الورقة الأخيرة بالرقم ١٢٧؛ هذه الأرقام مكتوبة بالقلم الرصاص ومحاطة بدائرة في أعلى يمين صفحة الوجه الجانب الأمامي للورقة أو لفرخٍ من الورق. كثيرًا ما يشار إليه اختصارًا بالحرف "و". من كل ورقة.

ترقيم الصفحات: هناك أيضًا خمسة تسلسلات إضافية مطبوعة لترقيم الصفحات على التوازي بين صص. ٦٤-٩٠، ٩١-٩٣، ٩٤-١٠٣، ١٠٩-١٧٧، ١٢٠-١٢٦.

لغة الكتابة
الإنجليزية بالأحرف اللاتينية
للاطّلاع على المعلومات الكاملة لهذا السجل

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"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٩‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٩٢)و المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندو IOR/L/MIL/5/777و مكتبة قطر الرقمية <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100087955907.0x0000c1> [تم الوصول إليها في ١٢ March ٢٠٢٥]

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