"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٨‎٩] (٢٥٦/١٨٠)

51
No. 236.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference your telegram of 25th instant. Independent examination prior to receipt of
Nixon's telegram of 26th November, leads us to agree generally with estimate of Turkish
strength at Ctesiphon and Baghdad and its rate of growth, except that we prefer to work on
the figures 60,000 by end of January, as estimated by combined War Office and Admiralty
staffs in their Memorandum of 19th October. Nixon is correct in his view that ruling factor
in rapidity of our concentration is^the supply of additional river transport, in which respect you
have received repeated requests from us to hasten rate of supplies, and we are searching India for
suitable vessels. In the meantime Nixon must do the best he can with what he has got,
which on a rise of the river and by marching troops from Amara should enable him to get the
Lahore and Meerut Divisions to Kut-el-Amara early in February. As regards his force,
Nixon is in error in counting upon 34th and 35th Brigades which are to be withdrawn when
replaced by Lahore and Meerut Divisions as their presence in India is necessary. It follows
that Nixon’s force may have to be increased from elsewhere, and in our opinion a safe estimate
for the capture and retention of Baghdad under altered conditions involves addition of at least
one more division which with the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and drafts will make Nixon’s
farce to five divisions in all. This estimate of five divisions which we consider a safe one is,
however, based on the following facts:—(1) That since 19th October, when the joint
Admiralty and War Office Staff drew up their memorandum nothing has occurred or is likely
to occur in the near East to prevent Turks sending the full amount of reinforcement then
considered possible ; (2) That Russia remains inactive in the Caucasus and north-west Pers : a.
If on the other hand it should be thought that any important modifications in above factors
have taken place or are likely to do so we consider Nixon will be able to capture and hold
Baghdad with four divisions and that it will not be necessary to draw an additional division
from the main theatre unless it were freely available owing to the general sti’ategic plan of
operations. To regard capture of Baghdad as impossible would be to give up our best means
of countering the German intrigues in Persia and Von Der Goltz’s plans for organising Persia
and Afghanistan against India and should therefore be dismissed from our calculations. Our
success hitherto in Mesopotamia has been main factor which has kept Persia, Afghanistan,
and India itself quiet, and to give up the idea of Baghdad would be to relinquish initiative
and would result in a further transference eastward of the theatre of war. For these reasons
we approve Nixon’s attitude in not discussing the alternative of adopting a defensive attitude
as a permanency though he must necessarily remain chiefly on the defensive until his
reinforcements can reach the front.
No. 237.
Sir John Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
30th. Tigris line. General Townshend is slowly withdrawing on Kut. Column under
Mellis left Aziziyah, 30th November, to reopen communications at Sheikh Saad. Enemy’s
advanced guard, strength 3,000, reported at Kutunie, main body at Zeur, 30th November.
No. 238.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 30th November 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference Nixon’s telegram of 29th November. Is he preparing strong defensive position
at Kut ? Does lie still propose to retain troops at Nasiriyah ?
No. 239.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated \st December 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Have received this morning two following telegrams from Townshend:—
( 1 ) “ Had to halt at Umattal Tubul to help ships and whole of enemy’s force overtook me
at daylight. Enemy in (?) lines, advancing at 2,500 yards. I managed to break off action
and retire by alternate echelons after fierce fight against overwhelming numbers and am
retiring in perfect order. Comet and Firefly lost, I fear ; will wire later."
(2) ° “ In continuation. I was informed during battle that Firefly had shell through her
boiler and smoke seen issuing from Comet. Troops were beautifully steady and only in this
way and very excellent (?) could I manage it. Our casualties I suppose 150. Owing to
great extensions I recalled Melliss during fight. Making for Shadie.’’
I have replied that I can best assist by taking Communications Staff and all ships and all
wounded now here not likely to be effective in ten days, with a small infantry escort and two
mountain guns to break through any resistance which may be encountered near Sheikh Saad
by ships to Basra to bring up reinforcements. If ships are blocked from here advance of
reinforcements will be indefinitely delayed. Am therefore starting as soon as all wounded
are on board with H.M.S. Butterfly and nine other ships, and expect to reach Sheikh Saad,
which is friendly, to-night. Cox' remains here, as he and I both consider his presence here
S 306 H