"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٨‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٧٣)

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immediately fronting him, and that on military and other grounds an action is desirable, they
should he allowed to give him the necessary permission to attack, but only on the eleai
understanding that he is not to attempt to enter or occupy Bagdad.
“ 2. From the information before the Committee, there would appear to he no puie \
defensive position near Bagdad of any great strength. Hut it is thought that the Bagdad
district, if occupied by a sutlicient force, offers considerable strategic advantages.
“ 3. Without Bagdad and the surrounding district as a base, the Turks could still assemble
considerable forces and undertake offensive operations. But with Bagdad in their possession
they would be much more favourably situated both for the concentration ol force and the
assumption of the offensive.
“ 4. From their imperfect knowledge of events in other theatres of war the Committee
are unable to foresee with any certainty the effect which a British occupation of Bagdad
would have on the Turkish forces engaged against the Russians and against ourselves in the
Dardanelles. _
“ Though the capture by us of Bagdad would undoubtedly be an inducement to the lurks
to withdraw force from other quarters in the hope of retaking that city, the extent to which
they would be able to do this would depend on events elsewhere. The Committee accept the
estimate of the General Staff that the Turks might in certain circumstances have 60,000 men
at their disposal, but consider that, even if this number of men were available, it would be a
very difficult operation to concentrate them in Mesopotamia and undertake offensive operations
if Bagdad were in our possession. '
India Office,
16//i October 1915.
No. 200.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17/A October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of loth October. Advance on Baghdad. Am I to under
stand that even if two Indian Infantry Divisions are transferred to Fgypt. the uncertainty of
position in the Near Fast may not merely delay their departure, but possibly even prevent
their being available at all for Mesopotamia ?
After consultation with Commander-in-Chief we agree that in no case could 1 undertake to
supply from India even temporarily a further force of the strength of a division.
No. 201.
Secretary of State for India to \ tceroy, dated 18/ h October 1 9 1 o.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of 17th October. Baghdad. Last paragraph. I thought
it right to consult you, but your answer is exactly what I stated in anticipation of your reply.
I trust that answer to your fmst paragraph will be in negative, but I understand your view r
to be that Nixon must not advance unless sailing of reinforcements is guaranteed. Am I
right ?
No. 202.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3B/ October 1915.
4
(Telegraphic.)
Private- Your private telegram of 18th instant. Baghdad.
Government of India are in entire agreement with His Majesty’s Government as to
political and strategic advantages of the capture and occupation of Baghdad which are
emphasised by contents of Mr. Marling’s telegram of 15th October, but we regard internal
security of India and the security of our frontier as our first pre-occupation, and are quite
unable to send a further foi’ce of strength of a division of troops from India to Mesopotamia.
After consulting Commander-in-Chief I consider that there are three alternatives before
us :—
(1) Take and occupy Baghdad. This will present no difficulty whatever, provided that
we are guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troops reaching Mesopotamia within
tw T o months from now. This will be the most satisfactory solution.
(2) Attack the Turks, raid Baghdad, capturing the few steamers that remain and stores,
releasing the English female captives, destroying the railway north of Baghdad and
dominating the city by river patrols from a camp south of Baghdad. This would have a good
political effect, and the fact that we were not in actual occupation of Baghdad might not
precipitate the despatch of Turkish reinforcements to recapture it. This, from a political
point of view', would be only the second best alternative, but it would not require addition of
a whole division to carry it out.
The Commarider-in-Chief from a military point of view dislikes this solution, and would
prefer either (1) or (3). He considers that Baghdad, being great centre of supplies and a
valuable base for whichever side is in possession of it, we must either hold it ourselves or
keep well away from it. He does not think that it is possible to dominate it from south..
\Ye should have to be camped close to the suburbs, which in his opinion gives us all the
disadvantages apd none of the advantages of occupation. His view is that unless we hold
Baghdad Turkish reinforcements will be gradually dribbled into it and we may be attacked
in strength without warning unless we are as far away as Kut-el-Amara. Nixon goes so far
as to consider that even without reinforcements his army would bo safer in and north of
Baghdad than anywhere south of it, and Commander-in-Chief lays great stress on the value