"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٨‎٤] (٢٥٦/١٧١)

42
Constantinople, and also to conjecture that arrival of Grand Duke in the Caucasus may imply
more rigorous military measures in Persia. If this surmise is correct, German great effort
would seem to be imminent. What direction it will take I have not enough indications-
to predict with certainty, but for the present Hamadan seems to he point of attack.
German Consul there is openly threatening our Consuls to avenge arrest of Turkish Consul
at Resht. He is said to have 300 tribesmen led by Germans in his pay against whom
Governor, who is timid though well-disposed, has possibly 200 decently led men, while
gendarmerie and police cannot be relied on. Government have sent 100 Persian Cossacks from
Teheran, but they confess that position is very bad, and that position of Consuls is most
precarious. Russian Minister is asking for permission from Petrograd to send a regiment of
Cossacks from Kazvin. Provided they are not indefinitely detained there, I think that
measure would be a good one, but we must not be led into undue weakening of our only force
within striking distance from the capital. Sultanabad is threatened. In Pars Wassmus is
making great efforts to prevent new Governor of Bushire from taking up his post. That
Germans intend an attempt of some kind in Teheran, seems to be clear from the fact that
Swedish Commandant of Gendarmerie has been inquiring of Armenians what their attitude
would be if Persian Government should declare themselves on the side of one of belligerents,
or, if an attack were made on Christians. Attempt would be certainly made in the month
Moharem, which begins now when religious fanaticism is easily roused.
No. 199.
Report of an Inter-Departmental Committee on the Strategical Situation in Mesopotamia,
dated \tith October 1915.
Terms oe Reference.
In accordance with a decision of the Cabinet of the 4th October, the Prime Minister
recommended that a consultation should without delay be held between representatives of the
India Office, the General Staff of the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office on
the subject of the strategic situation in Mesopotamia—To consider in particular, having
regard to the position in Persia, to the progress of the Bagdad Railway, and to all other
relevant matters :—
1. Whether there should be an advance on Bagdad.
2. Ihe defensive positions at Bagdad as regards a possible advance of Turkish troops.
3. 4\ hether without Bagdad as a point of departure any offensive operations on a large
scale could be made by the Turks in the neighbourhood.
4. Generally the effect which the occupation of Bagdad by us would have on the Turkish
forces engaged against Russia and against ourselves in the Dardanelles.
Report.
The Committee had before them :—
(a) Some former official telegraphic correspondence on the subject.
(?/) Recent official telegraphic correspondence from the 29th September up to the
10th Octobei between the Secretary of State for India, the Army Department of
the Government of India, and General Sir John Nixon, the Commander of the
British Forces in Mesopotamia, regarding the defeat of the Turkish Army at Kut-
al-Amara, on the Tigris, on the 28th September, and the military situation created
(c) Private telegrams from the 4th October up to the 9th October between the Secretary
of State for India and the Viceroy regarding the further operations of the
Mesopotamia Force, with Bagdad as the possible objective.
(d) Memoranda by the Military Secretary, India Office, and the General Staff, War Office,
dealing with the military aspects of an advance on and occupation of Bao-dad
0 ) Memoranda by the Political Department of the India Office, the Foreign Office, and
r . ^ Ir k° uis Mallet dealing with the political aspects of the question.
(/) The views of the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief in India upon the military
situation in that country as conveyed in a private letter from the Viceroy to the
Secretary of State for India.
2. The question of whether an advance upon Bagdad should be undertaken can be
considered from tv r o aspects :—
JL/e.oi.KAtuniTl an u Jr RACTICA
Ihe Desirability of an Advance to Bagdad.
, 3 - l >f ;. 1 , i , t ! cal .n ro T ls tl 1 ie ea !‘ 1 - v f a P tm ' e and occupation of Bagdad are considered mo
desirable. _ I his will relieve directly the existing situation in Asiatic Turkey in Persia a,
in Afghanistan. J ’
To quote from the Foreign Office memorandum {see Appendix VII.) :
‘“Bagdad is the centre of Government of the whole district, and controls the oreab
portion of the trade passing through. &
llu; effect of such occupancy would weaken the power and prestige of the Turki.
fTOvernment throughout the whole of Arabia, and would place within British control ti
sacred city of Kerbela ’ ” 11
“ An advance to Bagdad may be regarded from the political or Foreign Office point of vie
as of the very greatest tmportance, not only on account of the situation in Asiatic Turke.
. . . but more espectally with regard to the present critical situation in Persi an
even in Afghanistan. AClhld/ d11