"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٨‎٠] (٢٥٦/١٦٣)

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consider it emphasises great desirability of denying to enemy the use of so important h river
■junction as Kut. Gorringe is investigating report by means ot ‘U-top am am <> iei me
Falling waters in Hammar is causing great difficulties in case of larger river steamers, one
of which has been aground for three days.
No. 164.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated ’2<th July lbl5.
(Telegraphic.) ,, , . . . ., , ,
Now that Nasiriyah has been occupied the occupation of Kut al-Amarah is considered by
us to be a strategic necessity. Kut-al-Amarah is only four miles beyond limit ot l.asra
Vilayet; it commands the lower reaches of the Tigris and also the Euphrates by way ot
Shatt-al-Hai and its occupation will facilitate the reinforcement of our position on either river
and also enable us to control the powerful Bani Lam tribe and effectively safeguard the oil
fields against aggression from the Tigris. Once securely in possession, ve could pio >a i \
reduce materially our garrisons at Nasiriyah and Amara and thus economise^ out tioops.
Nixon has owing to sick found it necessary to demand reinforcements. He is also being
directed to despatch an Indian battalion to Bushire. In order to strengthen Nixon foi t ic
purpose of securing Kut-al-Amarah, we consider 28th Brigade should be moved from Aden
to Force “ D.” when this brigade can be spared from Aden. AVe agree with Younghusband
that an advance to Lahej should not be undertaken for the present. It will therefore be
possible to spare 28th Brigade from Aden shortly in order to assist Nixon in the captme of
Kut-al-Amarah, after which the brigade could again return to India. AVe request your
sanction to our authorising Nixon to capture Kut-al-Amarah and to employ 28th Brigade in
the operation, which we calculate would begin not later than earl\ in Septembei and should
be completed in time for the 28th Brigade to be back in Aden by November.
No. 165.
(Jeneral Nixon to Secretary of State for Imho, dated 28th duty HH5.
(Telegraphic.)
Euphrates Line. Evacuation of sick and wounded from Nasiriyah has commenced.
Navigation of Hammar Lake presents difficult problem. Transfer of units back to Tigris
Bine being carried out as shipping becomes available. Gorringe’s experience leads him to
recommend strongly more machine guns to keep down casualties, which were heavy on 24th
July. On 20th instant 1 asked for 56 more Maxims of latest pattern, and from the experience
of 24th July I request they may be sent me as soon as possible, but they should be of the new,
light pattern.
No. 166.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated o0//i July 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference Mesopotamia operations. As neither Young-husband's Brigade nor other
reinforcements are available a cautious strategy is imposed upon us.
I recognise fully strategic importance of Kut-el-Amara, but please let me know how it is
proposed to distribute troops after its capture.
If Kut-el-Amara is held in force, it seems unlikely enemy will take any further offensive
on Euphrates side, but will concentrate on Tigris line, therefore, we must be strong at Kut.
Assuming that defeated Turks are retiring by Shatt-el-Hai, do you think that any advantage
is gained by retaining troops in so unhealthy an outpost as Nasiriyah, with which communi
cations are difficult, especially when river falls ? Have you considered advisability of
withdrawal fr-om there and concentration of strength on Tigris side P
Bushire and Ahwaz must continue to be held as outposts for political reasons, but would
it not be well that remainder of troops should be at Basra and along Tigris ?
Please let me have your views before any decision is taken.
No. 167.
His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to Sir E. Grey, dated 3rd August 1915.
(Telegraphic )
Persian situation. His Majesty’s Consul-General at Ispahan has reported that he has
reason to believe that there will shortly be some 300 Germans and Austrians (latter being-
prisoners of war escaped from Transcaspia) assembled in that town. They are camped a
short distance outside the town and possessed of large quantities of rifles and ammunition
besides machine guns, bombs and a wireless telegraphy apparatus, and allow no one to
approach their camp. They have also considerable number of Mutahid in their pay. Small
parties of Germans are continually coming rid Kermanshah and amongst them probably
Oppenheim. Germans have more than once interrupted Indo-European Department wires
south of Ispahan and German Consul there has even written to Department’s officers
threatening to do so. Acts of this kind and this considerable concentration at Ispahan
obviously implies more than a mere attack on our Consulates, and popular rumour here
asserts that German design urged by democrats is to carry off the Shah and Government to
Ispahan. This is far fetched, but it is not improbable that hostile Legations contemplate
flight to Ispahan should Russian troops arrive at Kasvin and threaten the capital. Idea was
currently talked of three months ago. From this centre with communications open to Turkey