"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٧‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٥٣)

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of it. No infantry attack has developed so far, and guns ceased fire 2.d0 p.m. Guns from
Odin, and 4-inch guns from shore got good target on number of enemy in native boats. At
Alivvaz, artillery shelled our camp from 5 a.m., and were still doing so at noon, and
considerable body of cavalry showed themselves north and west and south, but no attack had
developed by noon. Telegraph wire to Kurna and Ahwaz both now interrupted, but I am in
communication with both by wireless.
No, 117.
General \ i.von to Secretary oj State Jor India, dated 14f/i April lltlo.
(Telegraphic.)
14th April 1915. Continued sniping, varied with heavy rifle and machine gun tire, covered
by attempts to cut wire round whole of perimeter, occurred throughout night of 12th-13th.
Cavalry reconnaissance early to-day found considerable strength towards Ana’s Tomb, rising-
ground, and in houses mile north of our northern defences. 1 decided to take offensive and
clear enemy from north of mound one-and-a-half miles north-west of Shaiba Fort. For this
operation 1 detailed three battalions under General Delamain, supported by fire of four
batteries. This was completely successful, and north mound was taken 11 a.m. Having
driven enemy northward 1 decided to continue offensive and drive him westward, prolonging
line to left with two battalions under Colonel Peebles, cavalry brigade protecting right flank.
By 2 p.m. enemy had retired two miles west of Shaiba Fort. By 2.30 p.m., when 1 decided
to stop pursuit, two guns, several standards, some 300 prisoners, and quantity of arms and
ammunition, had been captured. Shaiba reported following captures :—18 officers, 300 men,
2 guns. Prisoners say further determined attacks will be made night and day. Expenditure
of gun and rifle ammunition heavy ; details not yet known. Shall probably have to make
large demands. Return convoy from Shaiba was attacked by enemy in boats at 4 a.m. 13th.
Outward convoy to Shaiba, afternoon of 13th, proceeded in boats molested with strong
opposition from enemy armed boats, and had to return to Basra owing to desertion of all
native boatmen. Passage of this convoy will be forced on 14th by guns, &c., on rafts as
gunfire from shore found ineffectual. All quiet Kurna and Ahwaz 13th.
No. 118,
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated loth April 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Following telegram received from General Mellis:—
“ 11.50 p.m., 14th. In order to continue the offensive movement yesterday, 1 moved out
at 9 a.m. this morning witli my whole force less 104th and 48th, and 1 section of each field
battery. My advance was directed on south Mound 2 miles south-east of Shaiba Fort. This
was found to be held by enemy’s advanced troops. This position was made good at 10.30 a.m.
and advance continued on enemy’s position, which extended from high watch tower to north
end of Birjisiyeh wood, their troops being in well-constructed and carefully sited trenches.
Enemy was estimated at at least 15,000, including 0 regular battalions and 6 guns, of which
2 were of large calibre. They clung to the trenches with great tenacity and were eventually
turned out at point of the bayonet at about 4.30 p.m. Retirement commenced at 5.30 p.m.
and was entirely unmolested. Last troops reached Shaiba at 8.30 p.m. I regret casualties
were heavy both in officers and men, but 1 am not yet able to give any numerical details.
This will be furnished as soon as possible. All the troops behaved admirably, advancing
with great gallantry under very hot shell and rifle tire. About 200 prisoners and some
machine guns were captured.”
Shaiba is 4 miles north of Zobeir. Birjisiyeh wood is 4| miles west of Zobeir. High watch
tower is If miles east of Birjisiyeh wood.
IN 0. 119,
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated \&th April 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Further information regarding battle at Birjisieh on 14th instant shows Turkish
11 oops to be well disciplined, well trained, and brave, their machine guns to have been
well concealed and used with great effect, and their trenches to have been admirably sited,
part at 1,100, part at 800 yards, at foot of slope leading from us down to them. Heavy
losses were experienced as our troops topped ridge and began to descend. Turks had no idea
of being shot out of trenches, and had to be turned out by a charge of the whole line with the
bayonet. If pluck and determination of our troops, both British and Indian, had not been of
the sternest, and if they had not been handled with initiative and decision, battle would not
have been won. drenches were finally captured about 4.30 p.m., and being so well concealed,
biunt of taking them fell on the infantry. Our losses are heavy: 11 British officers killed
and wounded, and our total casualties are believed to amount to 700, but enemy have been
so severely handled that they retired night of 14th-15th to Nakhailah, 19 miles north-west of
Zobeyr, where at present 1 cannot pursue them. Greatest credit is due to General Mellis for
way m which he conducted operations, and conduct of troops as a whole worthy of all praise
Lhose engaged on Uth coasted of “ S ” Battery, 7th Lancers, 16th and 33rd Cavalry £
General Kennedy s Brigade; 63rd and 761], Field Batteries, and 23rd Mountain Battery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Cleave, 17th and 22 nd Companies Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant-
Colonel Kvans Dorsetsh.re Regiment, 117th and 119th Infantry in General DehmmhCs
fr^nS Mell^C^de ‘ h ’ 12 ° th ’ 6em!ral ^ K' ^e, and the 24th Punjabis