"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣] (٢٥٦/٤٩)

10
the Turks not being threatened north of Kut-ol-Amara, it is quite con
ceivable that, while containing us there, they would have pushed into Persia
through Khanikm last autumn, and theiebj ha\e foiestalled the bussians
at Karmanshah and got into easy touch with Persian centres ol disturbance.
Such a result might have been even more disastrous than the surrender of
Kut, as all Persia would have gone against us, Afghanistan would have
followed suit, and then the whole Indian frontier would have been in a
blaze. This, indeed, was the consideration which most influenced the India
Office. We assumed, from General Nixon’s reports
(i) That he had in front of him a beaten and demoralized enemy inferior
to his own force of 14,000 seasoned troops who for a whole year had been
marching from victory to victory.
(ii) That another Turkish defeat, followed by an occupation of Baghdad,
ofl’ered great strategical and political advantages, viz. :—
(а) Interior lines as regards Turkish columns dribbling towards Baghdad
by two widely-separated lines of approach—the Tigris line from
Mosul and the Euphrates line from Aleppo.
(б) A threatening position on the flank of a Turkish movement towards
Persia via Khanikin and Karmanshah.
(c) The control it would give over all the supplies which Mesopotamia
might otherwise furnish to the enemy.
(hi.) That the anarchy in Persia, largely fomented by German emissaries
and encouraged by the news of the approaching Turks, rendered the
position there most grave and critical both for us and the Russians.
At that time it must be remembered that neither in Persia nor in the
Caucasus had the Russian advance commenced, nor had we any reason
to suppose that it would be so successful as it has been. These reasons
alone, quite apart from the Dardanelles, seemed at the time to justify a
counterstroke which the General on the spot assured us was feasible. At
least, we may claim that the audacious advance urged by General Nixon,
approved by the Viceroy and sanctioned by the Government, had diverted
any immediate Turkish movement on Persia and entirely rivetted the
attention of the Turks till later on the Russians were ready to strike both in
Armenia and Kurdistan. The delay thus caused and the time thus gained
also enabled the Allies to regain the upper hand in Persia both in Teheran
and in the Provinces. The incipient rebellion was nipped in the bud, the
!OJufr/rtL lh reaterie d Jehad died of mevtron, and the Arabs still observed the waiting
7 ' attitude which has characterised their conduct throughout the war.
(e)— P7qy did ice attempt to hold Kut-el-Amara.
21. A minor ground of offence which has been raised against the Govern
ment by a few critics is the strategy which tied General Townshend to Kut,
after his retreat from Ctesiphon. The argument used has been that if he had
retired steadily down the Tigris to meet his approaching reinforcements,
the ultimate necessity for surrender would never have arisen and that the
combined force of three or four divisions, which General Nixon might then
have concentrated somewhere on the Tigris, would have been able to resume
the offensive.
On the face of it the argument seems sound but that course was not
considered possible by the authorities on the spot, a view which was
ultimately accepted by both the Government of India and the Secretary
of State.
Enquiries on this very point were made by the Secretary of State on
the 9th December after full discussion with the War Office. In reply
General Nixon had telegraphed on the 11th December {vide p. 42 of Precis)
stating that he and General Townshend had agreed that it was not advisable
to retire from Kut and, indeed, that retirement was no longer practicable.
The real facts are that General Townshend’s Division was worn out by
constant marching and fighting, and when it arrived at Kut on the
3rd December it sorely needed a rest after all its severe exertions. All the
supplies and munitions of the 6th Division had been accumulated in Kut.