"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٢٥٦/٤٨)

'9
I hese considerations taken separately would appear to have fully justified
at the time the course recommended by the Government of India and accepted
by the Secretary of State.
(d )—Why ice icent to Ctesiphon.
IS. The phase of the Mesopotamian campaign which ended at Ctesiphon
is naturally the one which has excited the most interest and the most
criticism. As already shown, when we advanced from Xurna the initiative
passed from the Secretary of State to the Government of India; similarly,
after the battle of Kut-el-Amara the initiative passed from the Government
of India to the General in Command.
19. Kut-el-Amara was captured on the 29th September. Four days later
the head of the pursuit had reached half way to Aziziyah. On the same
day (3rd October) General Nixon telegraphed, reporting various movements
and details. Ilis telegram also specifically added : —
“ I consider T am strong enough to open road to Baghdad* and with this intention I propose
to concentrate at Aziziyah {ride page 31 of precis).
# •* * # #
On the 4th October I submitted a Minute to the Secretary of State,
which is quoted at pages 31 32 of the precis,.and to which I would draw
the attention of the Committee, as it states, l believe correctly, not only
my own views, but those of the Secretary of State on the date mentioned.
On that same evening the Secretary of State telegraphed as follows to the
Viceroy :—
“ P.—As it appears that owing to difficulties of navigation, there is now little chance of
overtaking and breaking up the retreating Turks, there is no object in pursuing them any
further, and so under these circumstances I shall be glad to learn what Nixon’s present
intentions are. Subject to what may occur in Baghdad and elsewhere and to any proposal
you may now recommend, the orders which my telegrams of 24th April and 6th August conveyed
to you are still in force. Kindly send me by telegram an estimate of what you consider to be
the present strength in Mesopotamia of the enemy.”
The orders above referred to limited the operations to the Basra A'day at.
The history of what followed between the 5th October and the 21st October
is given as far as possible in narrative form at pages 33-38 of the precis.
I would particularly call attention to the proceedings of the Inter
departmental Committee (pages 35-56 of precis). The final decision w r as
taken at a war committee of the Cabinet held on the 23rd October, and on
that date the Secretary of State telegraphed the decision to the Viceroy. In
that fateful telegram it was expressly stated that “ Nixon may inarch on
Baghdad if he is satisfied that the troops he has are enough for the
purpose."
“ P.— This telegram was advisedly framed in a permissive form in case
General Nixon should have received information in the interval, so altering
the military situation, that he might wish to modify his plans.”
20. On the 22nd November was fought the battle of Ctesiphon, which,
though a tactical victory, unhappily proved a strategical defeat, and on the
25th, after the wounded had all been removed, the retreat to Kut-el-Amara
commenced.
The precis shows how step by step, the policy of the advance on Baghdad
adopted eventually by the Government, was in reality inexorably shaped
by the force of circumstances and though nothing can justify failure, it
may at least be urged in favour of General Nixon’s idea of advancing to
Baghdad, that a Turkish offensive in or through Persia would be rendered
impossible if we could take and hold that position. At the time anarchy
prevailed throughout Persia, and German intrigues were rampant, so that had
* The italics were not in the original telegram, but as this is the tirst definite suggestion
from General Nixon of going on to Baghdad, attention is called to it.
MS 266 C