"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢] (٢٥٦/٤٧)

8
IS. The Nasirij'eh operations were entrusted to Major-General Gorringe
His instructions were to secure the occupation of Nasiriyeh and the country
in its vicinity. The operations commenced on the 2< th June and ended with
the capture of Nasiriyeh on the 25th July. During June, the Tigris column
in spite of the season had not been inactive and reconnaissances had been
pushed up the river towards El Gharbi. This gradual extension of the
sphere of our military operations, with its resultant attenuation of strength,
was regarded with some anxiety by the Secretary of State, more especially
as it involved the withdrawal of troops from Basra and Ahwaz. General
Nixon too had reported (24th June)The concentration of Turkish troops at
Kut-el-Amara and an offensive movement down the Tigris. The political
situation in Persia and at Aden was also very critical about this period,
and in view of all these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain considered
that caution must be impressed. A telegram Avas therefore despatched
on the 12th July which ended as follows :—
“ It is understood that you will sanction no further advance, it being impossible to give
further reinforcements for Persian Gulf, and that for the time being you will content
yourself with holding the pipe line and the Vilayet of Basra.”
The capture of Nasiriyeh, however, seemed to the authorities in
Mesopotamia and India to necessitate a further advance, as is shoAvn by the
following extract from the Viceroy’s telegram of the 27th July 1915.
We consider now that the occupation of Nasiriyeh has been effected that it is strategi
cally necessary to occupy Kut-el-Amara. The latter is only 4 miles outside the limit of the
vilayet of Basra. By it both the Tigris lower reaches, and, by way of the Shat-el-Hai, the
Euphrates, are commanded. The reinforcement of our position on either river will be facili
tated by its occupation. We shall also be able to protect the oil fields effectively from attack
from the direction of the Tigris and the powerful Beni Lam tribe will be brought under
our control. Our garrisons at Amara and Nasiriyeh could probably be reduced and economy of
our troops thus effected when once we occupy Kut-el-Amara securely.
There was some further telegraphic discussion between Whitehall and
Simla but ultimately the advance to Kut-el-Amara was sanctioned by the
Secretary of State in his telegram of the 20th August 1915.
19. In September the forward movement was commenced. On the 15th the
headquarters of the bth Division reached Abu Rum man ah, six miles from
the Es-Sinn position, which had been very strongly fortified by the Turks.
The next few days were occupied by reconnaissances prior to the final
advance Avhich began on the 26th September. By the 29th, after severe
fighting, the Turks were put to flight and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-
Amara. During the action we captured more than 1,700 prisoners and
13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel.
This notable victory concluded a definite phase of the campaign, as by
it the complete occupation of the Basra Vilayat was secured. Kut-el-Amara
had been specifically suggested by the Viceroy as the goal of our operations
and it had been accepted as such by the Secretary of State.
The view of Lord Hardinge’s Government was (1) that the occupation of
Amara more completely protected the oil fields and Persian Arabistan;
(2) that Nasiriyeh was necessary to us to counteract Turkish influences
on the lower Euphrates and to protect Basra from another attack on that
flank; (3) that Kut-el-Amara Avas a better position, as it controlled
strategically the Shatt-el-Hai as Avell as the Tigris and, moreover, brought
the Avhole Basra Vilayet Avithin our political sway. Each one of these
contentions is incontrovertible. Had we not occupied Amara, the Turkish
inroad into Persian Arabistan Avould not have been dispersed Avith such
crushing effect as it was, nor could we have felt certain that the attempt
would not be repeated. Had avc not gone to Nasiriyeh the predatory tribes
on that flank might have been a perpetual thorn in our side, Aviiile avc
should have been constantly exposed to another Turkish attack on Bhaiba
and Basra. Had Ave not fought and beaten the Turks at Kul-el-Amara they
Avould have themselves concentrated there in great force last October after
the arrival 'of their reinforcements, and could then have operated at will
either against Nasiriyeh or against Amara