"كتاب أزرق. برقيات أُعيد صياغتها" [و‎‎١‎٨] (١٨٩/٣٥)

solution would be the most satisfactory one*
(2)* To attack the Turks, make a raid on Bagdad, release the
female English captives, capture the few stores and steamers
that remain an4 from a position S, of it, dominate the city
by patrols up the river T$$fe would not require a
whole additional division to accomplish, but would only be
the second best alternative froma a political point of view.
For military reasons the Commander—in-Chief w uld prefer
the first or third and dislikes the second alternative. His
opinion is that we must either h0Ld Bagdad ourselves or keep
^ell away from it, as it is a very valuable base and great
centae of supplies for whichever side is in occupation of it.
is in short against making a raid on Bagdad which
would involve a retirement. Should the required reinforce-
-ments he forthcoming, he favours strongly the holding of
T 'agdnd. However he prefers the safer course of holding a
position at Kut-el-Amama should they not be forthcoming.
:evertheless he feels that owin^ to the present situation
re may at any time have to accept the risk involved and find
it necessary to occupy Bagdad, even with our forces as they
e?ist at present.
From a political point view my comment on the Commander
-in-Chief f s opinion is, that to be driven out of Bagdad would
be disastrous.
Thirdly. Stay at Kut-el-Amara in a defensive position
Such a step does not commend itself to us, for it may force
us to advance qfter all, because both the Turks and the
Arabs will see that it is a weak measure.
I will leave the question for the decision J^His Majesty^
Jovernraent with confidence, having placed before you these
threw alternatives, but I hope that the first alternative
will be the one they decide to adopt.