"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٠] (٤٠٨/٣٤٧)

and strengthen. He could see no other satisfactory solution of this question than
signature of the protocol by His Majesty.
In the second place, he wished to discuss the article regarding the chiefs on the
Persian Gulf. His Majesty's Government, and particularly the Government of
India, felt strongly on this question. They were unable to admit any wording which
might be held to weaken the obligations which they were under to these chiefs, with
whom they had definite treaty relations. They therefore wished to retain in the
new treaty the wording of the similar article which appeared in the treaty of 1915.
Sir G. Clayton, however, wishing to meet His Majesty in every possible way,
was prepared to accept the wording of Ibn Baud's draft, provided he would agree
to the addition of the words " with whom His Majesty's Government have special
treaty relations."
With regard to the question of slavery, Sir G. Clayton was prepared, in view
of His Majesty's strong representations, to omit the clause dealing with the right of
manumission from the body of the treaty itself, provided that His Majesty would
accept from him a letter making it clear that His Majesty's Government would
continue to exercise that right, at least until developments should render the practice
obsolete.
Sir G. Clayton then informed His Majesty that he had found various alterations
inserted in His Majesty's counter-draft, which had doubtless been included with a
view to safeguarding the authority of the local tribunals. There was also the
objection' which Ibn Saud had' put forward to the nationality clause, with the same
object in view. After carefully studying the treaty as a whole and the various
observations and objections made by Ibn Saud, he had decided that the most
satisfactory course would be to take a bold step and to insert into the treaty an
article which would make the situation quite clear and dispose of His Majesty's
difficulties. He thought that Ibn Saud would agree that in taking this action a
very valuable concession had been made, and one which was equivalent, from a
practicable point of view, to a renunciation of rights acquired under the capitulatory
system.
In conclusion, Sir G. Clayton emphasised the following advantages and
concessions which the draft treaty gave to Ibn Saud and his Government:—
(a.) His independence and sovereignty were fully recognised by Great Britain,
who held a commanding position in the counsels of nations.
(b.) The somewhat onerous treaty of 1915 was cancelled.
(c.) He secured all the advantages which would accrue from complete under
standing and amity with Great Britain.
{d.) His Majesty's Government had met his views in regard to their special
position in mandated territories.
(e.) His Majesty's Government recognised fully the jurisdiction of Hejazi and
Nejdi courts in cases arising between British and Hejazi and Nejdi
subjects.
(/.) His Majesty Government were prepared to meet him by agreeing, with one
small addition, to the wording which he suggested for the article
referring to the chiefs of the Persian Gulf.
(g.) His Majesty's Government had agreed to omit the manumission clause from
the body of the treaty.
Against all this, His Majesty's Government only ask him to meet their wishes
by signing the protocol dealing with the Trans-Jordan frontier and by accepting a
letter which would make it clear that British consular officers would continue to
exercise, as heretofore, the right of manumission.
His Majesty replied that he had no doubt as to the good intentions of His
Majesty's Government, but that it must be borne in mind, especially in regard to the
question of the protocol, that both had many enemies who were only too ready to
raise difficulties and to criticise if given the slightest opportunity of doing so. As
regards the chiefs of the Persian Gulf, he had no intention of doing anything but
maintaining peace with them, but he found some difficulty in admitting a clause
which referred to treaties of which he had never seen the texts. He was prepared
to accept a letter on the manumission question, but asked that it should contain an
undertaking that British consuls would not seek out slaves with a view to granting
manumission and would refrain from releasing his own so-called slaves, who were
in reality either private servants or soldiers.
The new draft was then handed to His Majesty, and it was agreed that it