ملف ١٩٢٨/٢٠٠ الجزء ٦ "مفاوضات المعاهدة الأنجلو-فارسية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٧] (٦٤٢/٤٨)

I
most of the cards in our hand, without getting the
Persians appreciably nearer to giving us what we
want, and we may, to that extent, find ourselves
rather at a disadvantage if and when negotiations
d+JGr
are resumed at scene future
3, I understand that the general question of future
policy is under consideration in the Foreign Office,
and that we may expect to be addressed regarding it
in due course. Departmentally, their view is briefly
that, having regard to the Persian attitude, to the
difficulty of defending in present day international
conditions ^special privileges in Persia which have
not a legal basis, and to the desirability of reducing
-*> fjry*Z(rC\
onmxarap the directions in which Persia can
pinprick us, we should reduce our commitments in that
country to a minimum, and adopt a reserved and chilly
attitude with the Persian Government. Our commitments
concession, the naval base at Henjam; the little enclave
at Basidu; the Duzdap railway; the Bushire Residency,
•JL*s~+ I&*nJL /
1 mally the air route ncunifr the Gulf.' As regards
the first of these, the Foreign Office are inclined to
uhink that our position legally is so strong that it
would be impossible for the Persians, without complete
loss of face, to repudiate the concession and^(probably
in practice a more important argument)^that the revenue
they derive from the operations of the Angl o-Persian
Oil Company is so substantial that they are unlikely
to run the risk of killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs. The Foreign Office are inclined to favour
the evacuation of Henjam and consolidation y Bahrein.
On this point opposition may be expected from the
Admiralty. Henjam is strategically preferable and has
a better climate. Moreover a certain amount of
would/