مجموعة ٢٨/٢٨ "بلاد فارس: الحدود الفارسية البلوشستانية؛ تعيين الحدود قرب ميرجاوه." [و‎‎٣‎١‎٧] (٦٥٨/٦٤٤)

B. The Damani mercenaries whom Dost Muhamed is able to collect for
special occasions form a very volatile element. He can neither keep them in
his service for any length of time, nor employ them on any enterprise which
does not itself provide them with remuneration.
The Jeruft raid is an instance in point. Dost Muhamed was unable to
raise any revenue from the petty chiefs of Mekran whose forts he was too
weak to attack; and accordingly collected a contingent of Damanis. Their
presence in his train was sufficient to induce the chiefs to pay considerable
sums ; but none of this would he give to the Damanis, and the meagre loot
they had succeeded in collecting in that poverty-stricken district was not
sufficient for trouble they had taken. Dost Muhamel therefore proceeded
to kill two birds with one stone bj egging on the Damanis to get their
own payment for services rendered to him in looting certain tracts against
the chiefs on which he had an account to settle. The Damanis did their
work pretty thoroughly, lifting some 35,000 sheep and 90 camels and taking
to Bampur one of Zargham-us-Sultaneh’s petty chiefs.
It was these incidents in which the Damanis had done Dost Muhamed’s
work for him that led to the reports on which were based on the Hon’ble the
Agent to the Governor-General’s No. 3890 of 24th November 1923 (Serial
No. 135*) stating that the influence of Dost Muhamed over the Damanis had
recently shown signs of notable increase, and his No. 116-L.f of 4th December
anticipating that, on the Persian occupation of the Sarhad, most of the
Damanis would retire out of reach, and that the Persian troubles would begin
when they started to make an attempt to recover stock looted from Jeruft.
7. The factors which I had considerably underestimated were the extra
ordinary improvement in the moral of Persian troops of the Eastern Division,
and the very forceful personality of the Salar Amjad.
The tribes of the Sarhad were slow to believe that Persian troops could
reach the state of efficiency which the Salar’s men undoubtedly possess. The
Damanis would not believe in their power of offence, and the Bekis and
Ismailzais, whom we have used for the last 7J years as a counterpoise to the
Damanis, would not believe ia their power to defend them against their revenge.
These two more peaceful tribes were even ready to seek asylum in British
territory. Moreover, the Damanis would not believe that we really intended to
hand over the country to the Persians. In fact, till the last moment they
were trying to enlist | our aid against then?,.
8. When the Salar Amjad was at length ready to march, Major Dennys
preceded him to Khwash, and handled the Damanis so well that all of their
leading men, even Nnr Muhammad, who was at first most truculent and claim
ed to be the subject of “ Shah Dost Muhamed ”, remained to meet the
Persian troops. The Salar marched in with 800 men and 6 guns.
He had already given the Reki and Ismailzai chiefs written undertakings
to pay them allowances and give them service on an even more liberal scale
than we had done. In his treatment of the Damanis he took full advantage of
the situation we had created for him and of our experience ; and his strong
and open dealings made a deep impression on them.
He was compelled to return to Duzdap to get into touch with his superior
officers, and did not reach Khwash again till the day after my arrival on the
27 th.
9 After a thorough discussion with the Salar, the Damanis and the Reki
and Ismailzai chief, I arranged to hand over control of the tribes to the
Salar at a formal Darbar on March 1st.
The Darbar was preceded by a military display by the Persian troops, who
carried out a very creditable combined field firing operation at which the
Damanis were present. The Damanis were much impressed by the efficiency
* File 70(15?) M.
f Serial Ro. 152, ibid.
t Paragraph 7, Serial Iho. 245A v in File 70 (IV) M.